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“[Human beings] are endowed with reason 
and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.”∗∗ 
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I. INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
The initially ambitious march by members of the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO),1 clad with pompous commitments, to Cancún, Mexico in 
September 2003 for the fifth WTO Ministerial Conference quickly degraded 
into frustration and disappointment.2 Betraying hopes across the globe that 
it would usher in a new era of development and thus send a positive signal 
to the global village, the Cancún Conference failed to address rampant pro-
tectionism by the rich countries in the sectors of agriculture and textiles, on 
which many poor countries depend for their subsistence. Poor countries did 
not demand “special favors,” but merely that the rich “play[ ] by the rules,” 
which the rich coldly refused.3 As one African cotton farmer reportedly 
bemoaned, even the WTO is now against the poor, in addition to hardship, 
famine, and disease.4 While the collapse certainly precipitated skepticism 
about the WTO’s effectiveness, it also revealed problems inherent in the 
current system’s deep structural limitations.  
Despite a half-century’s institutional evolution, the WTO’s ontology 
largely remains an agora for trade “negotiation” in which reciprocal bar-
  
 1. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND; 33 I.L.M. 1140 (1994) 
[hereinafter RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1140 (1994) [here-
inafter WTO Agreement]. 
 2. See generally Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Confer-
ence in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 219 (2004) [hereinafter Cho, A 
Bridge Too Far]. 
 3. WTO, Summary of 10 September, 2003, Day 1: Conference Kicks Off with “Facilitators” 
Named and Cotton Debated, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_10sept_e.ht 
m (last visited Feb. 14, 2004). 
 4. BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE ON THE FIFTH WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE, At the Eleventh Hour, 
Divergence All Over Again, Issue 5, Sept. 14, 2003, http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/wto_daily/b 
en030914.htm. 
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gains take place among members, and members share only their affluence 
and not their hardships. Negotiation is, in itself, an inferior form of dis-
course in that its dialectical pressure tends to eliminate, not accommodate, 
voices of the less powerful. Negotiation reflects and reinforces power dis-
parities among participants.5 The power sensitive negotiation structure, in 
turn, even in the presence of official yet vague rules, tends to shape interna-
tional commerce in a mercantilist, or sometimes exploitive, fashion. There-
fore, in this global “Gesellschaft”—metaphorized as a “metropolis” pulling 
everything and everyone toward the global center via materialistic grav-
ity6—the poor and powerless are vulnerable to being ill-treated and margin-
alized. Their sufferings, although sympathized with intermittently, are struc-
turally and inherently off the radar of the rich and powerful and thus inac-
cessible to the latter’s socio-political equations that control resources and 
determine policy change. All told, “global empathy” does not exist in the 
current global trading system, and hence there is no true community.  
As a result of this condition, we often experience the perplexing and 
unpleasant phenomenon in which parochial, narrow-minded commercial 
interests in the rich countries block economic development in the poorest 
countries. For example, African cotton is driven out of the global market by 
highly-subsidized cotton production in the United States.7 Similarly, the 
European Union (EU), under its Common Agricultural Policy, bans the im-
portation of fruit and vegetables. These are the only types of products a 
small country like Moldova has to compete with, while lavishly subsidized 
like-products undersell Moldovan products even in the Russian market.8 To 
these Africans and Moldovans, the current global trading system, symbol-
ized by the WTO, is neither beneficial nor fair and legitimate. The ghost of 
Karl Marx still haunts us.9 
Admittedly, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 
1947),10 which was part of the post-war international economic architec-
  
 5. See Jeff Ward, Jürgen Habermas, at http://thispublicaddress.com/catalogue/Habermas.html (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2004). Ward criticizes the Platonic notion of dialogue emphasizing its outcome (persua-
sion), which tends to silence the voices of the persuaded (the powerless). He finds a more desirable 
construction in the Habermasian version, which regards dialogue as a process, rather than a result, and 
thus accommodates dissenting or minority views.  
 6. FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY 223-31 (GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT) 
(Charles P. Loomis trans. & ed., 1957), reprinted in MARCELLO TRUZZI, SOCIOLOGY: THE CLASSIC 
STATEMENTS 145-54 (1971) [hereinafter THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS], available at http://www2.pfeiffer. 
edu/~lridener/courses/GEMEIN.HTML (last visited Feb. 17, 2004). 
 7. See Stitched Up, ECONOMIST, July 26, 2003, at 71. Cf. Jagdish Bhagwati, Don’t Cry for Cancún, 
83 FOREIGN AFF. 52, 61 (2004) (submitting that the U.S. should have conceded on the issue of reducing 
of cotton subsidies). Recently, Brazil successfully challenged the U.S. cotton subsidies before the WTO. 
See WTO Appellate Body, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Sept. 8, 
2004). 
 8. See Outsiders Aren’t Helping—What Future for Moldova?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2003, at 48. 
 9. Here, I mostly focus on an international dimension of the Marxian apocalypse. For an excellent 
recount of its domestic dimension, see WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT: THE MANIC 
LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 39-53 (1998). See also After Communism—Marx: The Post-Communist 
Karl Marx, ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 2002, at 17. 
 10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [here-
inafter GATT 1947]. 
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ture,11 has contributed to unprecedented global economic growth during the 
past half century.12 GATT has served as an icon of, or an agent for, global-
ization.13 Many once impoverished countries, such as South Korea, were 
able to escape from their miserable economic status through a rewarding 
mechanism of international trade—successful accumulation of foreign re-
serves earned by export and re-investment of this capital for further eco-
nomic growth.14 This unremitting march of international commerce and its 
liberal agenda climaxed with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the launch of 
the WTO. The WTO succeeded GATT, implementing an even more ambi-
tious vision and agenda.15 A nirvana of global economic integration ap-
peared to be just a few steps away.  
However, deep beneath the wave of liberal optimism and promises of 
free trade ran an undercurrent of lagging development and poverty suffered 
by the poor and unfortunate.16 Globalization during the last two decades led 
many once-poor countries to a successful integration to the world market 
through a dramatic shift in their exports from primary commodities to 
manufactured goods and services. Therefore, three billion “new globaliz-
ers,” such as China, India and Mexico, were enabled to experience a large 
scale of poverty reduction. However, countries with around two billion peo-
ple, most living in remote corners of Asia, Africa, and Europe, fail to be 
included in the mainstream of global economic activities. The result of this 
frustrating phenomenon is that poverty in these countries is greater now 
than it was twenty years ago.17 
  
 11. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 35-37 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter WORLD TRADING SYSTEM]. 
 12. For instance, during the period of 1965 to 1999, the average annual growth rate of gross domes-
tic product (GDP) was 4.2% in the low and middle income countries and 3.2% in the high income coun-
tries; during the same period, the average annual growth rates of the exportation of goods and services 
were 5.3% and 5.9%, respectively. WORLD BANK, 2001 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 24-27 
(2002), available at http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2001/pdfs/tab1_4.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 
2004). 
 13. Globalization can be broadly defined as “the widening, deepening and speeding up of world-
wide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the 
financial to the spiritual.” GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 2 (David 
Held et al. eds., 1999). However, this Article focuses on an economic, more narrow aspect of trade and 
globalization. See id. at 149-88 (discussing global trade and global markets). 
 14. Regarding the role of trade in the economic development of Korea, see THE MULTILATERAL 
TRADING SYSTEM IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (Lee-Jay Cho & Yoon Hyung Kim eds., 2000); TUN-JEN 
CHENG ET AL., INSTITUTIONS, ECONOMIC POLICY AND GROWTH IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND 
TAIWAN PROVINCE OF CHINA (1996); and DAVID C. COLE ET AL., THE KOREAN ECONOMY: ISSUES OF 
DEVELOPMENT (1980). 
 15. Cf. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading System Through the 
1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 161, 189 (1995) (argu-
ing that the 1994 WTO Agreement “completes the original design of the Bretton Woods system, and 
reduces the existing fragmentation of international economic law, by a ‘global integration law’ for inter-
national movements of goods, services, persons, investments and payments”). 
 16. Nicholas Stern, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank, observed that 
“[a]bout one-fifth of the world’s population lives on less than $1 per day,” which is “unacceptable in a 
world of such plenty.” Nicholas Stern, Foreword to GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY: 
BUILDING AN INCLUSIVE WORLD ECONOMY, at ix (A World Bank Policy Research Report, 2002) [here-
inafter GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY]. 
 17. Id. at x, 31-32. In the same context, a recent report by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
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Given these circumstances, developing countries (the South)18 partici-
pated vigorously in the historic Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations con-
  
and Development (UNCTAD) sharply observed as follows:  
[T]he trade performance of developing countries during the past two decades has been un-
even. A number of countries, concentrated in East and South-East Asia, have been able to ex-
pand and diversify their exports of manufactures and increase their share of world trade. On 
the other hand, many least developed countries (LDCs) and other commodity-dependent de-
veloping countries have lost shares. In manufactures, the successful export performance of 
some countries does not always involve increasing domestic value added. A number of de-
veloping countries continue to depend on the export of undynamic products with low income 
elasticity and low value added, from both the primary and manufacturing sectors. Many la-
bour-intensive manufactures exported by developing countries are behaving increasingly like 
commodities, with a risk of market saturation that could lead to a fallacy of composition. At 
the same time, many middle-income developing countries are finding it difficult to upgrade 
their productive and technological profile, and they remain dependent on imported parts and 
components, as well as on design and technology skills. 
UNCTAD, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 33 (2002) [hereinafter UNCTAD TDR 2002], available 
at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//tdr2002_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). See also South Summit 
Hits Global Economic Gap: Havana Conference Assails “Marginalization” of Developing Countries, 14 
AFR. RECOVERY 24 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol14no2/g77summ 
t.htm. But cf. International Monetary Fund, Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries II 
(IMF Issues Brief, Nov. 2001) [hereinafter Global Trade Liberalization] (observing that the reasons for 
the marginalization of countries are complex, including “deep-seated structural problems, weak policy 
frameworks and institutions, and protection at home and abroad”), available at http://www.imf.org/exter 
nal/np/exr/ib/2001/110801.htm#i; Alexander J. Yeats et al., What Caused Sub-Saharan Africa’s Margin-
alization in World Trade, 4 FIN. & DEV. 38, 38 (1996) (observing that the anticompetitive policies of the 
developing countries are culpable for marginalization, rather than trade barriers), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/fandd/english/abstract/1296/06a1296.htm.  
 18. There is no official definition of “developing countries.” Countries often declare themselves to 
be developing countries, in which case other countries can challenge that declaration. Within the WTO 
system, developing countries are treated more favorably than developed countries under certain circum-
stances. For instance, developing countries may be given a longer period for implementing their obliga-
tions. However, these special rights under the WTO do not necessarily apply to other occasions, such as 
the granting of the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) status, which is determined unilaterally by 
donor countries. In the case of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the UN officially designated 50 
countries as the LDCs. See WTO, Development: Definition (Who Are the Developing Countries in the 
WTO?), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 
2004). On the other hand, a wide spectrum of developmental stages exists among developing countries. 
Markedly, divergent paths in terms of GDP per capita growth rate have been witnessed in the 1990s 
between “more globalized” developing countries, such as China, India, Uganda and Vietnam, and “less 
globalized” developing countries, such as many sub-Saharan African countries and the former Soviet 
Union. GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 5, 35. These more globalized de-
veloping countries, or new globalizers, are characterized by open trade policies, adequate basic educa-
tion and well-established legal systems. Id. at 35. On the other hand, three schools of thought, which all 
make sense to some extent, explain why these less globalized developing countries have been marginal-
ized: first, poor domestic institutions as well as policies are culpable, but they can be still improved (the 
“Join the Club” view); second, inherent disadvantages of unfavorable geography and climate are to 
blame (the “Geographic Disadvantage” view); and third, as a result of poor policies these countries 
permanently missed the opportunity to industrialize (the “Missed the Boat” view). Id. at 7, 39-40. Cf. 
ANNE O. KRUEGER, TRADE POLICIES AND DEVELOPING NATIONS 59-61 (1995) (discussing “[d]ifferent 
[g]roups and [i]nterests” of developing countries). Despite the existence of such a wide spectrum, when 
negotiating on certain issues vis-à-vis developed countries, coalition among developing countries may 
still be a conceivable strategy. See generally Rajiv Kumar, Developing-Country Coalitions in Interna-
tional Trade Negotiations, in THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE: POLICIES AND 
BARGAINING STRATEGIES 205-21 (Diana Tussie & David Glover eds., 1993) [hereinafter THE 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE] (discussing the experience of the umbrella coalition during 
the period leading up to the Uruguay Round); David Glover & Diana Tussie, Developing Countries in 
World Trade: Implications for Bargaining, in THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE, supra, at 
225-41.  
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ducted throughout the late eighties and the early nineties.19 A grand deal 
between the developed countries (the North) and the South finally launched 
the WTO in 1995. The South, in exchange for extended market access to the 
North, accepted the entire UR results as a “single undertaking.” This single 
undertaking included various new sectors, such as intellectual property 
rights and services, which the North had strongly demanded.20 Yet in the 
course of implementing the UR deal, the South became increasingly frus-
trated, chiefly because the North, contrary to its original commitment (the 
improved market access in development-sensitive products, such as agricul-
tural products and textiles), continued to maintain high trade barriers to im-
ports on those primary, labor-intensive products, such as agricultural prod-
ucts and textiles—the only products that the South can offer to trade.21 Such 
protection in rich countries costs developing countries over $100 billion per 
year, twice the total sum of foreign aid from North to South.22 Simply put, 
the balance sheet of the WTO enterprise has revealed only the “uneven dis-
tribution”23 of benefits among rich and poor members, thus failing to mate-
rialize the goal of substantial and sustainable economic development. Con-
sequently, seven years under the WTO has not narrowed the global income 
gap between the poor and the rich—the gap has widened.24 
  
 19. For a comprehensive survey concerning the impact of the Uruguay Round on developing coun-
tries, see generally THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Will Martin & L. Alan 
Winters eds., 1996). 
 20. UNCTAD TDR 2002, supra note 17, at 34.  
Participation in the WTO—like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) before 
it—has brought developing countries a number of important benefits, but also poses new and 
difficult challenges. Their willingness to participate has been motivated by the hope of im-
proved and more secure access to markets, particularly in the industrialized countries, and the 
expectation that the means to enforce acquired rights through the dispute settlement mecha-
nism would more than offset a loss in policy autonomy that follows from their taking on an 
increasing number of obligations, including market opening and the implementation of rules 
in new areas. 
Id. See also J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The 
Development Challenge, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO: A PRO-ACTIVE AGENDA 115-29 
(Bernard M. Hoekman & Will Martin eds., 2001) [hereinafter A PRO-ACTIVE AGENDA]; Evelyn Su, The 
Winners and Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Its 
Effects on Developing Countries, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 169, 195-218 (2000) (exploring the effects of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) on the economic development of 
developing countries). 
 21. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Two Principles for the Next Round or, How to Bring Developing Countries in 
from the Cold, 23 WORLD ECON. 437, 437-38 (2000) (criticizing the developed countries’ “hypocrisy” 
when they continuously exhort developing countries towards further market openings, while they still 
maintain trade barriers in sectors of natural comparative advantage for developing countries), available 
at http://www.worldbank.org/knowledge/chiefecon/articles/geneva.pdf; see also Celso L.N. Amorim, 
The WTO from the Perspective of a Developing Country, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 95, 96-99 (2000) 
(criticizing the WTO’s “development deficit” in the areas of agriculture and textiles). 
 22. GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 9, 53. 
 23. Mike Moore, Address at the Conference of African Trade Ministers, Algiers (Sept. 23, 1999) 
[hereinafter Challenges and Opportunities] (“There must be something in the pie for everyone. Not pie in 
the sky when we die, but pie on the table.”), at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm07_e. 
htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). 
 24. Global Gap Rising, World Bank Study Shows, UN WIRE, Jan. 18, 2002, at http://www.unfounda 
tion.org/unwire/util/display_stories.asp?objid=23173 (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). 
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Under these circumstances, the third WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Seattle was doomed from the start.25 In addition to general anti-
globalization sentiments, 26 the apparently irreconcilable fissure between the 
North and the South was one of the main culprits in the collapse of the Seat-
tle Conference.27 The “Northern Agenda” included the issues of climate 
change and regulatory enhancement in the areas of health, environment, and 
labor. These issues clashed with the “Southern Agenda,” driven by im-
proved access to the developed countries’ markets for agricultural and tex-
tile products.28 With unpleasant memories of tear gas and rubber bullets in 
the streets of Seattle still vividly haunting the WTO, the fourth Ministerial 
Conference was held in Doha, Qatar in November 2001.29 Once again, the 
chasm between North and South almost derailed the launch of the new 
round of negotiations for trade liberalization under the auspices of the 
WTO. It would have certainly done so without such extraordinary events as 
the global recession and the September 11 attacks. Consequently, some 
members were forced to be conciliatory in order to seal a deal. Ironically, 
this inclement climate drove negotiators from both rich and poor countries 
to reach a compromise, motivated by a prevailing understanding that the 
global trading system could go astray and eventually fail without an impetus 
at such a critical point in time.30 Yet despite the historic launch of a new 
round after painstaking efforts, implementation has been depressingly 
minimal, particularly in areas of development.31 This evanescent nature of 
the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) was painfully confirmed by the eve 
of the fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico in September 2003.32 
Clearly, development is not a new issue in international trade law. Since 
the birth of GATT, development has been discussed among contracting par-
  
 25. See Stiglitiz, supra note 21, at 437. 
 26. See Rob Norton, Not So Fast: Anti-Trade/Pro-Trade, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 2000, at 40. 
 27. GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 60. 
The Seattle WTO ministerial meeting failed to launch a new round, not because of the pro-
tests in the streets, but because the major trading powers lacked the political will to accom-
modate the interests of developing countries . . . . In order for developing countries to have 
confidence in a new round, rich countries must deliver on commitments made in the past, 
such as accelerating the agricultural trade negotiations and phasing out quotas on textiles and 
clothing. 
Id. (quoting the recent report of the UN High-Level Panel on Financing for Development); see also 
Diana Tussie & Miguel F. Lengyel, Developing Countries: Turning Participation into Influence, in 
DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 485, 491 (Bernard Hoekman et al. eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter HANDBOOK] (observing that “[a]fter the significant concessions made in the Uruguay 
Round, developing countries felt entitled to be included in the green-room process”). 
 28. Symposium, Issues Confronting the World Trading System—Summary Reports by the Modera-
tors, at www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_symp2001_modreps_e.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 
2004); see also Scott Vaughan, Trade and Environment: Some North-South Considerations, 27 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 591, 592 (1994) (detecting the “North-South impasse” in the area of environmental 
policies). 
 29. WTO, The Fourth Ministerial Conference (An Official Website), at http://www.wto.org/english/t 
hewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_e.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). 
 30. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 31. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 32. See Cho, A Bridge Too Far, supra note 2, at 219. 
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ties. Despite this long-standing engagement, efforts to deliver any substan-
tial and meaningful outcome to underdeveloped countries have failed for the 
most part. Many gestures have been made, but few actions have been taken; 
semblances of developmental aid, but no genuine assistance. Even the rare 
aid program concentrated on affirmative action-type measures such as tariff 
preferences. Tariff preferences, however, are doomed to fail since they do 
not reflect the development demands of the recipients, but depend strictly 
on the budgetary or political considerations of the donors. To wit, the aid 
programs have been handled in a temporary, spasmodic and unilateral di-
mension, at the mercy of rich donor countries. Most products in which de-
veloping countries enjoy a comparative advantage—and which, therefore, 
could be a potential threat to domestic industries in rich countries producing 
similar products—have been deliberately singled out from the list of goods 
receiving preferential access. Admittedly, the WTO has recently geared up 
to respond directly to the demands of the developing countries through the 
concept of “capacity-building.” Although this new direction of development 
assistance appears to be agreeable, and even laudable, the chronic quandary 
of a lack of physical and political capital has rendered previous develop-
ment programs fruitless and now fundamentally threatens the current initia-
tive. 
This Article focuses on the current development-related problems in the 
global trading system. A widening income gap and widespread poverty 
among trading nations denote the WTO’s Gesellschaftian nature—interest 
and power—resulting in structural distortion and manipulation. This Article 
maintains that the global trading system can achieve its development agenda 
and become fair and legitimate only through a critical paradigmatic trans-
formation enabled by the configuration of the “WTO’s Gemeinschaft.” This 
Article observes that a fundamental legal precept, the “Law of Nations” (jus 
gentium), plays a critical role in actualizing this communitarian telos. Part II 
redefines the global trading system through the theoretical lens of “Gesell-
schaft,” a term articulated by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies in 
the late nineteenth century. Part II tracks down futile attempts, under the 
Gesellschaftian limitation, to tackle development issues and consequent 
distributional injustice. Part III highlights and problematizes the Gesell-
schaftian limitation and resultant development failure as it enumerates the 
causes and effects of that failure: persistent protectionism, regulatory unilat-
eralism, and rhetoric without action. Part IV then attempts to address the 
development problem by overcoming the WTO’s Gesellschaftian limitation 
through exercising a communitarian paradigm shift and constructing, with 
the vehicle of the Law of Nations, the WTO’s Gemeinschaft. This consists 
of a dual agenda of free trade and development assistance implemented and 
vindicated in an atmosphere of global empathy. Part V concludes that an 
ideal project of WTO’s Gemeinschaft leads us to transform our perspective 
from could (right) to should (duty).  
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II. THE FLAWED GLOBAL GESELLSCHAFT: DEVELOPMENT LOST 
A. The Gesellschaftian Interpretation 
of the Global Trading System 
Tönnies’ illustrious dichotomy of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft, often 
translated as “society” and “community” respectively, provides simple yet 
powerful insights into human interactions and group dynamics. Gemein-
schaft in its original form, the “Gemeinschaft of Blood,” is defined as a 
natural human connection bestowed by birth and family. This can be devel-
oped into the “Gemeinschaft of Locality,” based on a common habitation or 
locale.33 In contrast, Gesellschaft is defined as an artificial human connec-
tion that people build up with the intent and interest to work together.34 Ge-
meinschaft connotes the “relationships in traditional agrarian societies,” and 
thus a rural life, while Gesellschaft connotes “sterilized associations which 
exist in the realm of ‘business, travel, or sciences,’” and thus an urban life.35 
The construction of GATT as a global Gesellschaft departs from the 
historical path-dependent structure of Tönnies’ original theory to the extent 
that GATT has not directly evolved from any pre-existing Gemeinschaft.36 
However, one can still discover useful corollaries of a Gesellschaft in 
GATT.37 The genesis of the modern global trading system, GATT was a 
“contract” among trading nations to achieve the collective purposes of re-
ducing and eliminating trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas. Thus, the 
original twenty-four “contracting parties” signed and ratified the multi-party 
contract, constituting a positivistic form of agreement. The prototypes of 
GATT were in fact interwar U.S. bilateral trade agreements aiming for re-
ciprocal tariff reduction negotiation.38 Therefore, GATT presupposes bar-
gains and quid pro quo, and requires the existence of “nullification” or “im-
pairment” of benefits—similar to the concept of “injury” in the law of con-
  
 33. Daniel S. Reimer, The Role of “Community” in the Pacific Northwest Logging Debate, 66 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 223, 229 (1995); FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY 33-34, 35, 41-44, 76-
78 (1967), reprinted in THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMMUNITY 7-10 (Colin Bell & Howard Newby eds., 1974) 
[hereinafter THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMMUNITY].  
 34. Reimer, supra note 33, at 229; THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMMUNITY, supra note 33, at 7-10. 
 35. Reimer, supra note 33, at 229 (quoting THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMMUNITY, supra note 33, at 7-
10). 
 36. THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS, supra note 6. 
 37. See Chi Carmody, When “Cultural Identity Was Not at Issue”: Thinking about Canada—
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 231, 237 (1999) (observing that 
the tension between trade and culture is a “modern manifestation of the age-old debate between society 
(Gesellschaft) and community (Gemeinschaft)”). Carmody’s main argument is that “too much Gesell-
schaft” corrodes the familiar local culture which represents Gemeinschaft. Id.  
 38. Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat’s Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 
615, 616-36 (1970) [hereinafter A Diplomat’s Jurisprudence]; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute 
Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement 
System Since 1948, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1157, 1171 (1994); Ernest H. Preeg, TRADERS AND 
DIPLOMATS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE KENNEDY ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE GENERAL 
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 23-24 (1970); Edwin Vermulst & Bart Driessen, An Overview of 
the WTO Dispute Settlement System and Its Relationship with the Uruguay Round Agreements, 29 J. 
WORLD TRADE 131, 136 (1995). 
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tracts.39 Interestingly, Tönnies himself conceived of a global Gesellschaft 
with the international nature of merchants and metaphorized it as a metropo-
lis where world commerce and traffic converge.40 
However, the statist structure of this global Gesellschaft, which was in-
herited from the Treaties of Westphalia, tends to invite mercantilist compe-
tition and the creation of national wealth, as states are likely to be obsessed 
with exportation and sensitive to importation.41 Moreover, the contract and 
negotiation characteristics of the global Gesellschaft tend to put its opera-
tion at the mercy of power dynamics among contracting parties. Simply put, 
you are likely to enjoy a better bargain if you are the superior, more power-
ful party vis-à-vis your counterpart in a contract. The mere existence of a 
convention seldom corrects the power disparity, mainly because the conven-
tion itself is a negotiational outcome. Worse, if you happen to be a very 
small party you can easily be trivialized and excluded from the negotiation 
itself; what remains is to accept the outcome (contract) as a fait accompli no 
matter how it affects you. Under these circumstances, even important con-
vention principles can be bent and clouded—not via violations per se, but 
through exemptions and reservations for the political convenience of the 
rich and powerful. 
Yet, more troubling than the blatant legal impotence of the global Ge-
sellschaft is the nature of the law and order itself. Under the current WTO 
system, legal remedies ultimately hinge on enforcement mechanisms, often 
sanctions or retaliation.42 Thus, international commerce is maintained in a 
belligerent situation through “underlying mutual fear” and veiled hostility 
toward each other.43 In the name of sanctions or retaliation, the WTO au-
thorizes and accordingly privatizes the unilateral imposition of trade barriers 
against the condemned, the very outcome which the WTO aims to elimi-
nate.44 In this regard, Steve Charnovitz trenchantly observes that “the World 
Health Organization does not authorize one party to spread viruses to an-
other. The World Intellectual Property Organization does not fight piracy 
with piracy. So the WTO’s use of trade restrictions to promote freer trade is 
bizarre.”45 
  
 39. Admittedly, most treaties would be some kind of contract from a positivistic standpoint in that 
they are based on the consent of contracting governments. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 438-39 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d rev. ed. 1966); Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 
291, 293 (1999). 
 40. THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS, supra note 6. 
 41. Michael M’Gongile, Between Globalism and Territoriality: The International Constitution and 
the Challenge of Ecological Legitimacy, 15 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 159, 166 (2002). 
 42. See Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 
763, 777 (2004) [hereinafter Cho, Remedies]. 
 43. THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS, supra note 6. 
 44. Steve Charnovitz, Should the Teeth Be Pulled?: An Analysis of WTO Sanctions, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 602, 
622 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002) [hereinafter POLITICAL ECONOMY].  
 45. Id.; see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the 
New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 477, 487 (1994) (observing that retaliation is not favored under the DSU 
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Furthermore, this enforcement mechanism itself reveals power imbal-
ances between the rich and the poor in the international law arena.46 Be-
cause the mechanism leaves retaliation in the hands of the winner, even if a 
poor member attempts to retaliate against its rich trading partner, such re-
taliation is likely to be ineffective due to the discrepancy between their eco-
nomic sizes.47 It is not the incompleteness of the enforcement mechanism 
which is biased against the poor,48 but rather the Gesellschaftian nature it-
self which begets this developmental dilemma. The WTO once acknowl-
edged this quandary when Ecuador attempted to retaliate against the EU in 
the course of the notorious banana saga. As a WTO arbitration panel point-
edly observed: 
Given the difficulties and the specific circumstances of this case 
which involves a developing country Member, it could be that Ec-
uador may find itself in a situation where it is not realistic or possi-
ble for it to implement the suspension authorized by the [Dispute 
Settlement Understanding] for the full amount of the level of nulli-
fication and impairment estimated by us in all of the sectors and/or 
under all agreements mentioned above combined. The present text 
of the DSU does not offer a solution for such an eventuality.49 
In addition, considering negative future political ramifications that such 
treacherous retaliation may precipitate against powerful trading partners, 
poor countries are not likely to opt for such an ephemeral, Pyrrhic victory.50 
Therefore, in the banana saga, Ecuador, even as a winner, had to stomach 
further negotiation with the EU to resolve the situation without retaliation 
because of the price it would have paid otherwise.51 On the contrary, big, 
  
because it is “by definition” against the WTO rules and also erects a new trade barrier). 
 46. See Cho, Remedies, supra note 42, at 785.  
 47. POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 44, at 625-26; Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Counter-
measures in the WTO: Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 
338 (2000). 
 48. See Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and 
Developing Country Interests (1999), http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/papers_2000/BPdisput.P 
DF (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). Horn and Mavroidis argue that the lack of a workable sanction mecha-
nism in the WTO tends to privatize the sanction against violators, which puts “economically and politi-
cally weak” countries in a disadvantageous position. Id. at 2.  
 49. European Communities, Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Re-
course to Arbitration by European Communities under Article 22. 6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU 
(Mar. 24, 2000), at para. 177 (emphasis added); see also Robert E. Hudec, The Adequacy of WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Remedies: A Developing Country Perspective, in HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 81, 84 
(observing that the WTO’s greater emphasis on retaliation makes the dispute settlement system even 
more “one-sided” than before, favoring larger developed countries); David Palmeter & Stanimir A. 
Alexandrov, “Inducing Compliance” in WTO Dispute Settlement, in POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 
44, at 646, 662. 
 50. See Cho, Remedies, supra note 42, at 786. 
 51. Banana Dispute: Ecuador and EC Hold Talks to Avoid WTO Dispute, 5 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE 
NEWS DIG., Apr. 24, 2001 (quoting an informed source stating that “[i]t is difficult for Ecuador as a 
small developing country with severe economic problems to resist major pressure from the US and the 
EU over the banana issue.”), available at http://www.ictsd.org/html/weekly/24-04-01/story3.htm. 
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rich countries can influence small, poor countries by a mere threat of sanc-
tions simply because the impact of retaliation to the latter would be so dam-
aging.  
B. Unearthing Development Disparity 
in the Global Gesellschaft 
1. Development Disparity as a Structural Dilemma 
At first glance, development appears to be such a natural corollary of 
international trade that the relationship does not seem to merit any particular 
inquiry or analysis. That is to say, countries trade with each other ultimately 
for the sake of their own economic development.52 The preamble of GATT 
also describes the fundamental purpose of international trade as various 
aspects of economic development, such as “raising standards of living,” 
“ensuring full employment,” and producing a “large and steadily growing 
volume of real income.”53 Classical international economic theory also sup-
ports this general proposition. According to the theory, trade leads each 
participant to specialize in products in which it retains comparative, not 
necessarily absolute, advantages over its trading partner. Such specialization 
reduces the average cost to produce goods for trade due to economies of 
scale. The collective welfare of trading nations increases when trading part-
ners exchange specialized goods through export and import since resources 
are reallocated in a more efficient manner than they were in a pre-trade (au-
tarky) situation.54 Therefore, every country taking part in this exchange 
game is expected to increase its welfare, whether it is rich or poor.55 In this 
sense, development may not be a special, independent agenda at all in inter-
  
 52. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Frankel & David Romer, Does Trade Cause Growth?, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 
379 (1999) (proving empirically that trade raises income). Cf. JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, 
THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 105-204 (1997) (introducing theories of development and 
underdevelopment including classical (Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx), 
neo-classical (Robert Solow), unbalanced growth, and heterodox theories (dependency analysis) of 
economic development); GERALD M. MEIER & JAMES E. RAUCH, LEADING ISSUES IN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 213-40 (7th ed. 2000) (highlighting the importance of education and human capital in 
economic development); but cf. DANI RODRIK, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF 
TRADE: AS IF DEVELOPMENT REALLY MATTERED 10 (Oct. 2001) (arguing that not trade but “domestic 
institutional innovations” contribute to economic development), available at http://www.undp.org/mainu 
ndp/propoor/docs/pov_globalgovernancetrade_pub.pdf. 
 53. WTO Agreement pmbl. WTO Agreement Annex 1A incorporates a document labeled GATT 
1994, which is essentially GATT 1947, as amended through the Uruguay Round, along with all the 
ancillary agreements pertaining to GATT 1947, as modified. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 1A, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 
supra note 1, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
 54. RICHARD E. CAVES ET AL., WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION 38-48 (7th ed. 
1996) [hereinafter WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS]. 
 55. This mutually beneficial effect of trade, though it is derived mostly from an economic stand-
point, can also be glimpsed in the early history of GATT, which was characterized by a parity of obliga-
tions among contracting parties, regardless of economic development. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 4 (1987) [hereinafter HUDEC, DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES]. 
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national trade; development is, in fact, presumed in trade.56 In sum, the gen-
eral proposition that trade connotes economic development seems to be 
supported not only by intuition but also by theory.  
However, the simple, yet appealing, original vision of the global Gesell-
schaft is in fact non-existent in the real world. A somber reality check soon 
reveals that the aforementioned free trade proposition is subject to limita-
tions and qualifications which expose the vulnerability and disadvantage of 
the poor, less-developed trading partners vis-à-vis the rich, fully industrial-
ized ones. These vulnerabilities and disadvantages can be approached and 
recounted in a variety of ways. First, even economists admit that economi-
cally dominant countries may strategically improve their terms of trade at 
the expense of their smaller trading partners using such mechanisms as “op-
timal tariffs.”57 On the other hand, under certain circumstances, over-
concentrated production of commodities whose world demands are highly 
inelastic, such as agricultural products, tends to lower real incomes of ex-
porting developing countries through a deterioration of their own terms of 
trade. For instance, when Brazil decides to increase coffee production in 
pursuit of the theory of comparative advantage, it may encounter (and pre-
cipitate) declining prices of coffee and consequently diminished real income 
merely because of the vast amount of coffee production in the world market. 
This rather paradoxical phenomenon, which is called “immiserizing 
growth,”58 casts the counterintuitive and frustrating insight that hard work 
and a good crop do not necessarily bring prosperity. 
Secondly, developing countries or least-developed countries (LDCs) are 
still largely blocked from exporting their products of natural comparative 
advantage to their trading partners. This state of unfree trade, in most cases, 
originates in domestic politics. In a horizontal sense, regional economic 
blocs exclusively share preferential and thus discriminatory treatment, 
which tends to hurt non-member countries, whose economic scale is rela-
tively small and who are consequently most affected by exclusive policies.59 
  
 56. This basic position on trade and development has recently been reiterated at the UN’s Interna-
tional Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico in March, 2002 by a num-
ber of world leaders, such as the U.S. President George W. Bush (arguing that “the vast majority of 
financing for development comes not from aid but from trade and domestic capital and foreign invest-
ment”), the Iranian Finance Minister Tahmasb Mazaheri (pointing “to trade as ‘the most important 
vehicle for financing of development’”), the World Bank President James Wolfensohn (stressing that all 
trading nations would eventually “benefit from more open trade”), the IMF Managing Director Horst 
Koehler (describing “trade as ‘the most import avenue for self-help’”), and the WTO Director-General 
Mike Moore (pointing “out that ‘poor countries need to grow their way out of poverty and trade can 
serve as a key engine of that growth’”). Mixed Reaction on Trade in Financing for Development Out-
come, 6 BRIDGES WKLY TRADE NEWS DIG., Mar. 26, 2002, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02 
-03-26/story3.htm. 
 57. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: 
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 22-24 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter LEGAL PROBLEMS].  
 58. WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS, supra note 54, at 64-67. 
 59. The creation or enlargement of preferential regional trading blocs among developed countries or 
between developing and developed countries is likely to worsen the marginalization of the LDCs. In 
general, those blocs diffuse pre-existing sector-specific protections via the common external trade poli-
cies that all members of the blocs adopt. Therefore, this regional expansion of protection impedes not 
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In a vertical sense, powerful domestic industries in the developed countries 
often lobby against the importation of competitive products from develop-
ing countries that enjoy a comparative advantage in the production of those 
goods. Under either situation, the comparative advantage of developing 
countries fails to be realized, eventually dampening their development proc-
ess. 
Third, non-trade factors continue to constrain poor countries, encroach-
ing on any modicum of a developmental base that they manage to establish. 
For instance, heavy foreign debts borne by most of the LDCs frustrate trade-
induced development because a large portion of money earned through 
trade must be devoted to the service of debt.60 Furthermore, a number of 
LDCs, particularly those located in sub-Saharan Africa, regularly suffer 
from catastrophic events such as civil wars, pandemic diseases, and natural 
disasters that international trade seems so powerless to cope with.61  
Critically, however, a new factor has begun to contribute to the increas-
ing developmental gap between rich and poor nations. Under the banner of 
the welfare state, the governments of the rich countries have been eager to 
enhance the quality of their social regulations in areas such as human health 
and the environment, thereby both increasing the number of new regulations 
and reinforcing pre-existing ones.62 In addition, unseen hazards combined 
with new scientific revelations have fueled consumer angst and led to deep 
regulatory intervention, as in the case of genetically modified (GM) foods.63 
Heightened levels of regulatory protection require sufficient capital, tech-
nology, education, and institutions, none of which are available to the nec-
essary extent in poor countries.64 Only developed, industrialized countries 
  
only North-South trade, but also South-South trade through serious trade diversion, resulting in a disaster 
for the LDCs since their economic development depends upon the export of only one or a few products, 
such as agricultural products or textiles, on which they enjoy comparative advantages vis-à-vis devel-
oped countries. Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New 
Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 449 (2001). 
 60. See infra subpart IV.B.3 (discussing the insufficiency of market access as a tool for develop-
ment). 
 61. See, e.g., Jeffrey Sachs, Helping the World’s Poorest, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1999, available at 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidinthenews/articles/sf9108.html. Sachs emphasized that too many coun-
tries are “stuck in a trap of poverty” from which they will not be able to escape without a true interna-
tional partnership. Jim Wurst, Poverty II: Poorest Countries Can Never Escape Without Aid, Sachs Says, 
UN WIRE, June 18, 2002, at http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20020618/27090_story.asp; see also Jef-
frey D. Sachs, A New Framework for Globalization, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 63-77 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001); cf. 
Richard Blackhurst et al., Options for Improving Africa’s Participation in the WTO, in A PRO-ACTIVE 
AGENDA, supra note 20, at 95-114; David F. Luke, Trade-Related Capacity Building for Enhanced 
African Participation in the Global Economy, in HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 509-15 (regarding vari-
ous options for the integration of Africa into the global economy). 
 62. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), Agricul-
ture, Food and Fisheries, available at http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en_2649_37401_1_1_1_1_374 
01,00.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). 
 63. Cf. Judson O. Berkey, The Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, ASIL INSIGHTS (Oct. 
1999) (regarding diverging regulatory philosophies on biotechnology), at http://www.asil.org/insights/in 
sigh37.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). 
 64. In the same context, Professor John Jackson highlighted the importance of “human institutions” 
in benefiting from the market economy, citing pre-eminent economists like Ronald Coase and Douglas 
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enjoy such an infrastructure.65 To other countries that are incapable of estab-
lishing the necessary infrastructure, trading with rich countries while com-
plying with their high regulatory threshold is prohibitive. 66 Therefore, poor 
countries fail to integrate themselves into the global economy via trade and 
are pushed toward the edge of the global Gesellschaft. 
Against this backdrop, it is fair to say that a “development disparity,” 
not just development, is entrenched in the current global trading system, 
where a classical economic philosophy on trade and development generates 
only limited practical significance.67 For the purpose of this Article, devel-
opment disparity can be defined as the existence of disproportionate levels 
of economic development between the rich and the poor trading nations 
resulting from non-trade, structural reasons such as infrastructure disparity. 
Although the development disparity has been consistently manifested in the 
troublesome tension of North versus South, it has recently been more 
dramatized and complicated due to a stampede of entrants into the WTO, 
who used to be subject to the centralized economic system but now struggle 
to overcome chronic poverty and underdevelopment by actively tapping into 
the global trading system. If left neglected, the development disparity will 
further marginalize the poor, developing countries, and consequently affect 
the rich countries in various ways in our highly interdependent world. A 
cataclysmic global recession may occur due to the collapse of poor coun-
tries’ economies and the subsequent decline of global purchasing power 
through a chain effect. Humanitarian disasters would follow, represented by 
starvation and a flood of refugees. The absence of a resolute approach to 
development disparity not only creates an international economic system 
malfunction, but also generates the vast economic injustice that forces many 
poor nations to remain in their current miserable economic status despite 
their best efforts. This is the very reason why development disparity should 
be a serious, independent agenda in the WTO’s Gesellschaft.  
  
North. John H. Jackson, Reflections on the MJIL Special Issue, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 185 (1999); 
John H. Jackson, Global Economics and International Economic Law, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1 (1998), 
available at http://www.jiel.oupjournals.org. Cf. Implementing Agenda 21: Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., para. 192, U.N. Doc. E/CN.17/2002/P.C. 2/7 (2001) [hereinafter 
Agenda 21 Report]. 
 65. See Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 440 (observing that “underdevelopment is an inherent reflection of 
poorly functioning markets”); EDWARD F. BUFFIE, TRADE POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5 (2001) 
(questioning an “export-oriented” trade strategy in poor countries where market failures are common). 
 66. See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR 
MARKETS 3-27 (2002) (highlighting the role of institutions in development); CARLOS A. MAGARIÑOS, 
MARGINALIZATION VERSUS PROSPERITY: REFLECTIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 1 (2000) 
[hereinafter MARGINALIZATION VERSUS PROSPERITY] (observing that “inadequate flows of information, 
skills and knowledge,” constitute a barrier to development), available at http://www.unido.org/doc/5002 
3.htmls (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).  
 67. For a more radical view, see Raj Bhala, Marxist Origins of the “Anti-Third World” Claim, 24 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 132, 133 (2000) (submitting that the “WTO is anti-development, and international 
trade law helps tilt the playing field on which the great game of trade is played against developing coun-
tries”). 
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2. Development Under the Early Gesellschaft (GATT 1947):  
Spasmodic Charity 
In the pre-GATT era, colonialism represented the most conspicuous re-
lationship between rich and poor countries.68 Yet, its pattern varied depend-
ing on the parent state and on the location of the respective colonies. Ac-
cording to Robert Hudec, colonies in Asia and Africa were formally linked 
to their parent countries, such as England and France, forming “de jure 
colonies,” while those in the Central and South America were connected to 
the United States rather loosely, constituting “de facto” colonies.69 In the 
latter case, no formal trade preferences were found in various bilateral trade 
agreements between the United States and its de facto colonies that would 
characterize those agreements as “sovereign-to-sovereign dealings.”70 Fol-
lowing the Second World War and the establishment of the Bretton Woods 
architecture, the United States’ bilateral trade agreements having no general 
tariff preferences, in particular one with Mexico in 1942, became the GATT 
archetypes.71 Yet, other allied countries, such as England and France, were 
eager to include those preferences in the initial GATT draft not only for the 
economic well-being of the colonies, but also for their own reconstruction 
needs.72 Realistically, it can be argued that the spirit of non-discriminatory, 
free trade would better serve the economic interests of the United States at 
its high time of dominance, just as England advocated free trade in its own 
high time in the nineteenth century.73 Against this background, “parity of 
obligation” came to prevail in GATT 1947, and no particular concern for 
developing countries appeared in the early text save the “token exceptions,” 
such as an infant-industry protection clause in Article XVIII.74 However, 
these were seldom invoked.75  
This parallel stance changed in the fifties, when former colonies rapidly 
gained independence.76 Both parent states—in particular, England and 
France—and former colonies were eager to establish a non-reciprocal, pref-
erential system in GATT 1947, either through tariff preferences or more 
drastic waivers.77 Moreover, the idea that developing countries required 
special treatment began to gather steam within the GATT Secretariat and 
  
 68. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 55, at 6. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 7. 
 72. Id. at 10. 
 73. See Patrica Clavin, The Triumph of Regionalism Over Globalism: Patterns of Trade in the 
Interwar Period, in REGIONAL TRADE BLOCS, MULTILATERALISM, AND THE GATT: COMPLEMENTARY 
PATHS TO FREE TRADE 31, 32 (Till Geiger & Dennis Kennedy eds., 1996). 
 74. Id. at 4. The United States viewed this clause as a major concession and refused to adopt any 
other trade preferential system in the ITO draft. Id. at 14. 
 75. LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 57, at 1169.  
 76. BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD 
TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND 385-86 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter THE WTO AND BEYOND]; 
HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 55, at 23-24. 
 77. THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra note 76, at 386. 
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contracting parties.78 Thanks to this changed atmosphere, contracting parties 
added Section B to Article XVIII in order to allow developing countries to 
deviate from their GATT obligation for the balance-of-payment (BOP) rea-
son.79 Although textually vague, Article XVIII was frequently invoked and 
interpreted in a very lax fashion80—undermining the legal integrity of the 
early GATT.  
Advocates for international development gained more support when the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was 
launched in 1964. UNCTAD eventually pushed the GATT contracting par-
ties to accept the notion of “non-reciprocity,” which diverged sharply from 
the premise of the tariff reduction mechanism under GATT, and to codify 
this idea by adding Part IV on Trade and Development to the GATT text.81 
Nonetheless, the real impact of Part IV has been questioned because of its 
non-binding, hortatory nature.82 Another watershed in the history of devel-
opment was the U.S. response to a call from UNCTAD to accept the Gener-
alized System of Preferences (GSPs),83 which was nothing more than a non-
reciprocal, unilateral mechanism of tariff preferences.84 Subsequent institu-
tional efforts reinforced the GSP by acquiring a GATT waiver in 1971, and 
  
 78. LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 57, at 1168. 
 79. THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra note 76, at 386. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 387-88; see also Gerard Curzon & Victoria Curzon, GATT: Traders’ Club, in ROBERT W. 
COX & HAROLD K. JACOBSON, THE ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE 298, 309 (1973); José E. Alvarez, The 
WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 149 & n.17 (2002). 
 82. LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 57, at 1171; MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE 
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 371 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE]. In a very rare case in the seventies, the GATT panel ruled that the EC’s failure 
to join the developing countries in the International Sugar Agreement to stabilize world sugar prices 
violated Part IV, in particular Article XXXVIII:1. However, the EC rejected this specific conclusion 
thanks to the veto power under the old GATT dispute settlement mechanism. European Communities, 
Refunds on Exports of Sugar, L/5011; GATT B.I.S.D. 27S/69-98 (Nov. 10, 1980), available at http://ww 
w.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm. See also ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 474-76 (1993) 
[hereinafter HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW].  
 83. Under the Generalized System of Preferences, developed countries offer non-reciprocal prefer-
ential treatment, such as low or zero duties on imports to products originating in developing countries, 
but developed countries (preference-giving countries) unilaterally determine the recipient (which coun-
tries) as well as the subject (which products) of the GSP schemes. See generally WTO, Development: 
Main Legal Provisions, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d2legl_e.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 
2004). For instance, The U.S. GSP provides preferential duty-free entry for more than 4,650 products 
from approximately 140 designated beneficiary countries and territories. U.S. Trade Representative, A 
Guide to the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Development/ 
Preference_Programs/GSP/asset_upload_file333_5430.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). The U.S. GSP 
program was instituted on January 1, 1976, and authorized under Title V of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 
U.S.C. 2461 et seq. (2000), for a ten-year period, and the authorization has been renewed four times. Id. 
(July 4, 1993, by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984; July 31, 1995, by the Uruguay Round Agreement 
Act; May 31, 1997, by the Small Business Act of 1996; and June 30, 1998, by the Budget and Recon-
ciliation Act of 1997). 
 84. Id.; THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 82, at 374-75. In contrast with the 
GSP, the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) was invented during the early seventies, under the 
auspices of UNCTAD, as a system of tariff preferences negotiated and applied only among developing 
countries. Id. at 378. The GSTP was initiated by UNCTAD’s aspiration to promote South-South trade 
amid developed countries’ domination of North-South trade. Id. 
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the Enabling Clause made the waiver permanent following the Tokyo 
Round in 1979.85 In general, the Enabling Clause86 codified earlier princi-
ples and practices of development-related exemptions, such as the BOP 
exception under GATT Article XVIII.87 This “de facto amendment” 88 of the 
obligations under Article I established a general legal reference for non-
reciprocal or special and differential treatment under GATT 1947. This se-
ries of developmental initiatives may be understood in a much broader po-
litical dimension—the context of the Cold War. Considering that GATT 
1947 was operated and led by the anti-Communist (Western) bloc, it would 
not be hard to imagine that those initiatives were, in certain respects, moti-
vated by foreign affairs considerations against the Soviet (Eastern) bloc.89 
It is still doubtful that the commitments and promises described thus far 
have helped developing countries to improve their economic situation, to 
escape from their chronic poverty, and to catch up with developed countries. 
The most problematic feature of preferential developmental aid under 
GATT 1947 (such as the GSP) can be found in its “unilateral, spasmodic” 
nature.90 Development aid is essentially subject to the discretion of donor 
countries, sometimes even under “paternalistic overtones.”91 Recipient 
countries not only fail to raise their own concerns and demands but also are 
forced to accept various conditions—often the adoption of certain labor 
standards or cooperation with drug control—attached to such aid, despite 
the fact that those conditions are often irrelevant to trade matters.92 Under 
these circumstances, the political whim of donor countries, driven by the 
political mood of domestic constituencies, tends to hamper the efficacy of 
preferential development aid programs, as the total volume of these pro-
  
 85. THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra note 76, at 387. 
 86. WTO Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Partici-
pation of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/wto.gatt.developing. 
countries.enabling.clause.1979/landscape.  
 87. THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra note 76, at 388.  
 88. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 55, at 85. 
 89. Id. See generally MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, EAST-WEST TRADE AND THE GATT SYSTEM (1979). 
 90. In fact, GSP benefits were limited to a small number of elite developing countries. See Frieder 
Roessler, Domestic Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order: Lessons from the Past, 19 U. 
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 513, 519-20 (1998). 
 91. MICHEL KOSTECKI, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES IN TRADE-POLICY: A CONTRIBUTION TO 
THE DISCUSSION ON CAPACITY-BUILDING IN THE WTO 6 (ICTSD Resource Paper No. 2, Nov. 2001) 
[hereinafter TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES], at http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/resource_pap 
ers/TApaper5-12-01.pdf. 
 92. See Roessler, supra note 90, at 520; LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 57, at 1192-93; Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements, and the Expansion of 
International Institutions, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 529, 569-76 (2000) (regarding a similar condition im-
posed on developing countries when the IMF grants them structural adjustment loans). Cf. Charlotte 
Denny, US Ties New Aid Package to Reform Targets, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Mar. 23, 2002 (reporting 
President Bush’s new “compact for development” linking aid to the poorest countries to the country’s 
domestic reforms such as market opening and anti-corruption activities), available at http://www.guardia 
n.co.uk/debt/Story/0,2763,672648,00.html. Recently, the WTO panel ruled against such conditioning. 
See European Communities, Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 
2003), available at 2003 WL 22873192; see also ÇAGLAR ÖZDEN & ERIC REINHARDT, THE PERVERSITY 
OF PREFERENCES: GSP AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY TRADE POLICIES 1976-2000 (World Bank, Working 
Paper No. 2955, 2003), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/23188_wps2955.pdf. 
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grams decreases with the introduction of elements of irregularity.93 More 
significantly, the unilateral, temporary nature of the abovementioned prefer-
ences, or “special and different treatment,” tended to induce a short-term 
economic view on the part of developing countries. Both governments and 
the private sector demonstrate rent-seeking behavior based on short-term 
preferences, rather than pursuing longer-term structural reforms based on 
the painful, yet rewarding, process of efficient resource allocation under a 
classic model of international trade.94 
Nonetheless, these adverse aspects of development assistance did not 
justify other developmental strategies or initiatives that departed from the 
original prescriptions of GATT 1947. For instance, “import-substitution 
policies,”95 which were applied experimentally in the Latin America 
economies, left behind enormous inefficiencies caused by high cost in local 
production as well as the nurturing of local monopolies, and eventually 
faded away in the sixties.96 Similarly, the New International Economic Or-
der (NIEO),97 which reacted to “interventionist trade policies” and at-
tempted to move trade forums from GATT to the United Nations, was a 
failure. This resulted not only because it was built on “bad economics and 
naïve politics” despite “well-intentioned legal theorizing,”98 but also be-
  
 93. The IMF expressed the same view on the shortcomings of preferential aid programs. In an 
Issues Brief, it stated: 
For a variety of reasons, preferential access schemes for poorer countries have not proven 
very effective at increasing market access for these countries. Such schemes often exclude, or 
provide less generous benefits for, the highly protected products of most interest to exporters 
in the poorest countries. They are often complex, nontransparent, and subject to various ex-
emptions and conditions (including noneconomic ones) that limit benefits or terminate them 
once significant market access is achieved. 
Global Trade Liberalization, supra note 17, at III; see also WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
PROSPECTS 2004: REALIZING THE DEVELOPMENT PROMISE OF THE DOHA AGENDA 215 (2003) (high-
lighting that “[p]references have not increased the share of the least developed countries in imports into 
the European Union and the United States”), available at http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gep2004/ 
full.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).  
 94. See J. Michael Finger & L. Alan Winters, What Can the WTO Do for Developing Countries?, in 
THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 365, 385 (Anne O. Krueger ed., 1998) [hereinafter 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION]. See also Jagdish N. Bhagwati, The Poor’s Best Hope: Trading for 
Development, ECONOMIST, June 22, 2002 (highlighting the “perils of preferences” and urging the poor 
nations to return to the basic tenet of free trade on a “non-preferential” basis), available at http://www.cf 
r.org/pub4631/jagdish_n_bhagwati/the_poors_best_hope__trading_for_development.php. 
 95. “Import substitution” refers to a strategy for economic “development from within” that empha-
sizes domestic production of basic consumer goods as a substitute for importation of those goods. JAMES 
M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 174-75 (1997).  
 96. THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra note 76, at 408. Although the import substitution strategy failed 
to bring economic growth to developing countries, its rationale of “self-sufficiency” might be under-
standable considering the developing countries’ bitter experiences of exploitation in the colonial period. 
Id. at 386. In the face of the demise of the import substitution policies, this rationale came to be reincar-
nated in the form of a “dependency theory” that attributes underdevelopment to “complicity between the 
local power, elites and the forces of developed-country capitalism.” THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 82, at 382. 
 97. See generally LARS ANELL & BIRGITTA NYGREN, THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE 
WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER (1980) (regarding a detailed background as well as a comprehensive analysis 
of the NIEO). 
 98. Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures Against Foreign Envi-
ronmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?, 95, 
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cause most developed countries withdrew their support when it became 
apparent that the NIEO privileged sovereignty over international law, par-
ticularly in the area of expropriation.99  
3. Reinventing the Gesellschaft?: Uruguay Round and the 
Nascent “Capacity-Building” 
By the late eighties, the contours of the global Gesellschaft had been 
vastly transformed. An intensified move towards global market integration 
led to much freer movement of goods, services, and capital. The fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War offered a supportive context for a 
higher level of material globalization, and developing countries became 
eager to reap the benefits of participating in the global marketplace.100 
Moreover, they had already learned that inward-looking developmental 
strategies, such as import-substitution policies, fail to deliver solid eco-
nomic growth.101 Developed countries also needed the support from devel-
oping countries to launch a new trade round that would address both old and 
new issues. The result was a successful, new North-South bargain con-
cluded in the Uruguay Round, which led to the establishment of the 
WTO.102 As an essential part of this bargain, developing countries agreed to 
the inclusion of new sectors under the WTO system, such as services and 
intellectual property rights.103 This proactive, participatory approach on the 
part of developing countries in the new global trade order seemed to match 
an ambitious telos of the WTO, epitomized by an integrated, more viable 
and durable multilateral trading system.104 
With this transformation in the relationship between developed and de-
veloping countries, the nature of development assistance also began to 
change. Apart from the past donor-recipient relationship,105 the new dy-
namic between developed and developing countries has elevated their rela-
tionship to the level of a partnership,106 through which the parties exercise 
  
110 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). 
 99. LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 57, at 1194-96. 
 100. See Alejandro Jara, Bargaining Strategies of Developing Countries in the Uruguay Round, in 
THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE, supra note 18, at 27. 
 101. THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra note 76, at 391-92. 
 102. LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 57, at 1183. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See WTO Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl. 
 105. Press Release, WTO, Speech by the Director General Mike Moore, National Conference on the 
Millennium Round, Rome (Nov. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Rome Speech], available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/pres99_e/pr146_e.htm. 
 106. “Development, in the knowledge era, must mean partnerships based on sustainable systems of 
innovation in both developed and developing nations for equity to be achieved.” Globalization: Neither 
a Devil Nor a Panacea, OECD OBSERVER, June 27, 2000 (citing the statement by Baldwin Sipho 
Ngubane, South African Minster for Art, Culture, Science and Technology), available at 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory/php/aid/288. In the same context, J.M. Migai Akech de-
tected the current shift in the U.S. development assistance policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa from aid 
to trade, which can be dubbed a “neoclassical paradigm” in that this shift is based on the idea of creating 
a “unified global economy” through further trade liberalization, in contrast with capitulations, which 
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collective efforts in the pursuit of the aforementioned telos. Under these 
circumstances, the focus of development assistance shifted from a short-
term, unilateral ground to a long-term, collective ground.107 Critically, de-
velopment assistance came to emphasize the “capacity-building” of devel-
oping countries from their own standpoint, rather than from that of their 
donors.108 Capacity-building requires an organized set of resources from 
multiple sources109 and presupposes a well-surveyed “needs assessment,”110 
to produce “tailored,” “demand-driven,”111 or “beneficiaries-oriented”112 
assistance packages. According to Joseph Stiglitz, the degree of sensitivity 
to the special needs of developing countries tends to determine the fairness 
of trade relations between developed and developing countries.113  
In various new side agreements under the WTO system, capacity-
building programs of this kind are widely apparent. This reflects the realiza-
tion that without such assistance developing countries would never be able 
to “implement” new obligations flowing from those agreements,114 such as 
the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS),115 the 
  
tend to impose the Western policies and rules on non-Western developing countries. J.M. Migai Akech, 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act: Implications for Kenya’s Trade and Development, 33 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 651, 651-53 (2001). 
 107. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, supra note 91, at 6. 
 108. Press Release, WTO, General Council Special Session on Implementation: 22 June 2000 Or-
ganization of Work and Indicative Schedule of Meetings, available at www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres 
00_e/pr184_e.htm; Press Release, WTO, Officials Examine How to Analyze Risk for Food Safety 
Measures (June 20, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres00_e/pr183_e.htm; News 
Items, WTO, WTO Highlights January–August 2000 [hereinafter WTO Highlights January–August 
2000], available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news00_e/bknote_e.htm (last visited on Feb. 23, 
2004); APEC, Statement of Chair, Meeting of APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade (Darwin, Austra-
lia, June 6-7, 2000), available at http://www.apecsec.org.sg/content/apec/ministerial_statements/se 
ctoral_ministerial/trade/2000_trade.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). In a broad sense, this increasing 
attention to each developing country’s capacity derives from the early failure of developmental prescrip-
tion, which developed countries touted in the eighties. Based on the so-called “Washington consensus,” 
policy recommendations from developed to developing countries chiefly focused on stringent fiscal and 
monetary policies without due consideration of each developing country’s economic structure or “differ-
ent response capacity,” producing very uneven results and thus rendering the “first-generation” reforms 
unsatisfactory. MARGINALIZATION VERSUS PROSPERITY, supra note 66, at 4-6. Against this background, 
the “second-generation” reforms in the nineties came to highlight the “right set of institutions.” Id. at 6-
7. 
 109. In this sense, the OECD views capacity building as synonymous with “networks across institu-
tions and individuals, often across borders, to achieve common objectives.” OECD, Trade and Devel-
opment in the New Global Context—The Capacity Dimension 4 (OECD Policy Brief, Sept. 2001) [here-
inafter OECD Policy Brief], available at http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,2340,en_2649_201185_18 
99092_119696_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). 
 110. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, supra note 91, at 15-16. 
 111. Id. at 15. 
 112. Id. at 6. 
 113. Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 450. 
 114. See Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of 
Inter-State Relations, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 549, 552 (1999) (defining “technology transfer” or “aid mecha-
nisms” to foster the implementation of treaties by less developed countries as the application of “differ-
ential treatment”). 
 115. Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra 
note 1, Annex 1A, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND [hereinafter SPS Agreement], available at http:// 
wto.org/english/doc_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).  
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Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), 116 and the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).117 For instance, the SPS Agree-
ment offers certain patterns of technical assistance, such as “research and 
infrastructure,” “establishment of national regulatory bodies,” and “techni-
cal expertise, training and equipment” to assist developing countries in 
building the capacity to implement the Agreement.118 Similar assistance 
programs are also found in the TBT Agreement and the GATS.119 These 
new provisions triggered a four-fold increase in the actual demand for tech-
nical assistance by developing countries during the first five years after the 
launch of the WTO.120 This phenomenon underscores the commitment to, 
and struggle with, the implementation of new and burdensome obligations 
on the part of developing countries. Markedly, the emphasis on capacity 
building has also been found outside of the WTO realm. One example is the 
recent regulatory rule-making treaty on “bio-safety.”121 Along these lines, a 
  
 116. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, 
Annex 1A, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND [hereinafter TBT Agreement], available at http://www.w 
to.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2004). 
 117. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 
1B, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33. I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
 118. SPS Agreement, supra note 115, art. 9. 
 119. TBT Agreement, supra note 116, art. 11; see also WTO News: 2000 News Items, Developing 
Countries Call for More Help in the Area of Technical Barriers to Trade (July 20, 2000), at www.wto.or 
g/english/news_e/news00_e/wkpres_e.htm; WTO News: 2000 News Items, Workshop on Technical 
Assistance and Special and Differential Treatment in the Context of the TBT Agreement (July 20, 2000), 
at www.wto.org/english/news_e/news00_e/chairs_e.htm. Regarding the GATS, most developing coun-
tries want specific mechanisms for “effective implementation” or even “operationalisation” of Article 
IV. WTO’s Draft Guidelines for Services Talks Strive for Inclusiveness, 3 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS 
DIG. 5 (Jan. 30, 2001), available at http://www.ictsd.org/html/weekly/story5.30-01-01.htm.  
 120. See Challenges and Opportunities, supra note 23. 
 121. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Convention on Biological Diversity, arts. 20, 22, Jan. 29, 
2000, available at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp. 
Article 20, paragraph 1 (A Biosafety Clearing-House) 
A Biosafety Clearing-House is hereby established as part of the clearing-house mechanism 
under Article 18, paragraph 3, of the Convention, in order to: 
(a) Facilitate the exchange of scientific, technical, environmental and legal information 
on, and experience with, living modified organisms; and  
(b) Assist Parties to implement the Protocol, taking into account the special needs of de-
veloping country Parties, in particular the least developed and small island developing 
States among them, and countries with economies in transition as well as countries that 
are centres of origin and centres of genetic diversity. 
Article 22 (Capacity Building) 
1. The Parties shall cooperate in the development and/or strengthening of human resources 
and institutional capacities in biosafety, including biotechnology to the extent that it is re-
quired for biosafety, for the purpose of the effective implementation of this Protocol, in de-
veloping country Parties, in particular the least developed and small island developing States 
among them, and in Parties with economies in transition, including through existing global, 
regional, subregional and national institutions and organizations and, as appropriate, through 
facilitating private sector involvement. 
2. For the purposes of implementing paragraph 1 above, in relation to cooperation, the needs 
of developing country Parties, in particular the least developed and small island developing 
States among them, for financial resources and access to and transfer of technology and 
know-how in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, shall be taken fully 
into account for capacity-building in biosafety. Cooperation in capacity-building shall, sub-
ject to the different situation, capabilities and requirements of each Party, include scientific 
and technical training in the proper and safe management of biotechnology, and in the use of 
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remarkable aspect of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is its “country-
specificity” approach. Among other things, the Protocol emphasizes the 
“special needs” of developing countries,122 and therefore seeks to “identify” 
these needs before it launches any assistance program.123  
Another critical aspect of development assistance is the maximization 
of its effectiveness through the integration of discrete activities conducted 
by different international organizations.124 Collaboration among the WTO, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other UN 
agencies is regarded as crucial not only because it ensures the concentration 
of scant resources, but also because it provides developing countries with 
more coherent and focused assistance for capacity-building projects.125 For 
instance, the World Bank assists developing countries to build human and 
infrastructural capacity, while the WTO helps them to implement their legal 
obligations.126 To execute this form of inter-institutional collaboration, rep-
resentatives of the six core agencies (IMF, International Trade Center, 
UNCTAD, United Nations Development Program, World Bank, and WTO) 
formed the “Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance 
to Least-Developed Countries (IF),”127 pledging to make the IF an effective 
mechanism for capacity-building.128 
In conclusion, the global Gesellschaft has begun to initiate development 
programs centering on capacity-building as a result of a grand bargain be-
tween the rich and the poor in the Uruguay Round. Although the direction 
of those programs is correct, mere initiation of programs never delivers ac-
  
risk assessment and risk management for biosafety, and the enhancement of technological 
and institutional capacities in biosafety. The needs of Parties with economies in transition 
shall also be taken fully into account for such capacity-building in biosafety. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 122. Id. at art. 20. 
 123. Decision V/1, Annex A (3), Convention on Biological Diversity, UNEP/CBD/BS/TE-BCH/1/IN 
F/3 (Aug. 4, 2000), available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/meetings/bch/tebch-01/information/tebch-
01-inf-03-en.pdf. 
 124. The WTO is increasingly underbudgeted and understaffed in technical cooperation activities. 
WTO Committee on Trade and Development, 27th Sess., WTO Programme for Technical Cooperation, 
WT/COMTD/W/64 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
 125. See generally WTO, Coherence: Closer Cooperation between Multilateral Institutions, at www. 
wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/coher_e.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004); WTO Highlights January—
August 2000, supra note 108. 
 126. To help developing countries to fulfill their legal obligations through implementation, legal 
training and advice is critical. See Press Release, WTO, 14th WTO Trade Policy Course Comes to an 
End (July 14, 2000), at www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres00_e/pr187_e.htm. 
 127. See Integrated Framework, http://www.integratedframework.org/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). 
 128. WTO News: 2000 News Items, Joint Statement on the Mandated Review of the Integrated 
Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least-Developed Countries (IF) by the Six Core 
Agencies (IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, World Bank and WTO) (July 6, 2000), at http:// www.wto.org/e 
nglish/news_e/news00_e/ifstat_e.htm. This integrated pattern of efforts to help developing countries to 
build capacity through technical assistance to implement trade-related regulatory treaties, such as the 
TBT and the SPS, can also be found in a recent decision of the WTO General Council. The General 
Council Decision on “Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns” urged international standard-setting 
organizations to ensure participation of developing countries throughout all phases of development. See 
WTO General Council, Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, WT/L/384 (Dec. 19, 
2000). 
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tual results. As discussed below, these attempts have thus far borne little 
fruit for a variety of reasons that derive mainly from the Gesellschaftian 
structure of the current global trading system. 
4. Reaffirming the Gesellschaftian Dilemma: The Futility of the 
Doha Development Agenda  
The fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar was haunted by 
two grave events: the debacle of the third Ministerial Conference in Seattle 
and the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. These 
two events pressured delegates from both rich and poor countries to strike a 
deal to send the global village a strong signal. If the Doha Conference had 
collapsed like the previous Seattle talks, it would have been a fatal blow to 
the credibility of the global trading system. International commerce would 
have been chilled and damaged, particularly in view of the U.S. recession, 
which was compounded by the September 11th attacks. This desperate at-
mosphere contributed to the conclusion of a deal between developed and 
developing countries, despite the failure of the Seattle meeting that left a 
seemingly unbridgeable chasm between Southern and Northern agendas.129 
In preparation for the Doha Conference, developed countries had revealed 
their strong interests in new issues, such as investment and competition pol-
icy. Developing countries, on the other hand, remained fiercely opposed to 
these ideas. They emphasized the importance of old issues, such as agricul-
ture and textiles, in addition to other implementation-related challenges.130 
This chasm was eventually bridged simply to save the meeting, which inevi-
tably rendered the final Ministerial Declaration more rhetorical than sub-
stantial.  
Markedly, the Doha Conference was labeled a “development round.” 
Even before the Doha Conference, there existed a wide consensus in the 
international society that any new trade initiative had to take into account 
development issues, ranging from poverty eradication to secured access to 
essential medicines. Not only the UN Secretary-General, but also the World 
Bank President and the IMF Managing Director expressly advocated the 
launch of a development round in Doha.131 In this respect, the Doha Minis-
  
 129. See Qatar Meeting to Take Place Despite Security Concerns, UN WIRE, Oct. 23, 2001, at 
http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20011023/20084_story.asp; Talks Extended; EU Withdraws Objections, 
India May Follow, UN WIRE, Nov. 14, 2001, at http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20011114/21720_story. 
asp. 
 130. Doha Ministerial: Six Key Issues in Search of a Solution, 1 BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE 1, Nov. 9, 
2001, available at http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/doha/wto_daily/englishissue1.htm. 
 131. Annan Calls for “Development Round” of Trade Talks, UN WIRE, Sept.19, 2000, at http://www. 
unwire.org/UNWire/20000919/10846_story.asp. World Bank President James Wolfensohn also warned 
that “global poverty and the resulting social unrest threatens to destabilize developed countries” and that 
“it is in their interest to bring about poverty alleviation in the developing world because we are one 
world and, unless we get stability and growth in the developing world, we are not going to have a peace-
ful world.” Wolfensohn Promotes Equitable Growth, UN WIRE, Sept. 22, 2000, at http://www.unwire.or 
g/UNWire/20000922/10924_story.asp; cf. Frederick M. Abbott, The Enduring Enigma of TRIPs: A 
Challenge for the World Economic System, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 497 (1998) (arguing that the developed 
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terial Declaration seems ambitious and promising. The rhetoric drew atten-
tion from the outset through language like “well targeted, substantially fi-
nanced technical assistance and capacity-building programmes.”132 Straight-
forward usage of terms, such as “particular vulnerability” and “marginaliza-
tion,” reflects the realization by the delegates of the seriousness of devel-
opmental concerns.133 Moreover, no new issue, such as investment and 
competition policy, failed to be accompanied by some commitment to tech-
nical assistance.134 Nonetheless, it would be too early to celebrate the Doha 
Declaration. Closer inspection reveals that the Declaration is rife with ver-
bal commitments but lacks detailed and concrete action plans or programs 
for development. No paragraph speaks of how to fund the ambitious techni-
cal assistance project. Furthermore, its legal nature as a “work program” is 
still controversial, making it implausible to argue that it is formally binding. 
In sum, it would be fair to say that the Doha Declaration amounts to more of 
a blueprint for future development assistance than to an enforceable legal 
document. It is unimaginable that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
would ever be employed to enforce the work program under the Doha Dec-
laration.  
Frustratingly, current developments in the implementation of the Doha 
round seem only to confirm this pessimistic view. The WTO Director Gen-
eral, Supachai Panitchpakdi, deplored disappointing trade figures for 2001 
and early 2002,135 as well as the failure to agree on the urgent issue of ac-
cess by the poor countries to essential medicines.136 Meanwhile, the new 
U.S. farm bill introducing $180 billion in subsidies over the next decade, 
and the EU’s failure to reform its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) initi-
ated by a Franco-German collusion were “making a mockery of the idea 
that the Doha round was to be a ‘development round.’”137  
The fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico in September 
2003 was doomed by these gloomy post-Doha developments. The Cancún 
conference collapsed amid an apparent lack of political will toward devel-
opment. Many of the developed countries anticipated local elections. Addi-
  
countries’ emphasis on the static protection of intellectual property rights is misplaced and that this 
“emphasis on maintaining technological advantage is a ‘beggar thy neighbor’ approach” incompatible 
with an integrating world economy). 
 132. WTO, Ministerial Declaration: The Fourth WTO Ministerial Meeting (Doha, Qatar), 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para. 2 (adopted Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. See also id. at 
paras. 38-41. 
 133. Id. at para. 3. But cf. Philip C. Aka, Africa in the New World Order: The Trouble with the Notion 
of African Marginalization, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 187 (2001) (arguing that the concept of margin-
alization is troubling because it “depicts Africa as sui generis, when most of the problems Africans face 
are global features of underdevelopment common to the developing world as a whole”). 
 134. Doha Declaration, supra note 132, at paras. 20-21, 23-24. 
 135. WTO Says Slowdown Underscores Need for Progress on Doha, UN WIRE, Oct. 11, 2002, at http 
://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20021011/29596_story.asp. 
 136. Press Release, WTO, Supachai Disappointed over Governments’ Failure to Agree on Health and 
Development Issues (Dec. 20, 2002), at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres02_e/pr329_e.htm. 
 137. Finance and Economics: Trading Insults; The Zoellick Plan, ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 2002, at 81; 
see also Leaders: Coming Unstuck; World Trade, ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2002, at 14. 
File: TheWTO'sGemeinschaft Created on: 5/31/2007 9:32:00 AM Last Printed: 6/11/2007 10:58:00 AM 
508 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 56:2:483 
tionally, an alliance of unprecedented intransigence existed among the most 
influential developing countries. Most of all, developing countries de-
manded that agricultural subsidies be scrapped so that they could earn hard 
currencies from the export of their agricultural products—the only way for 
many of them to escape poverty. Yet, developed countries countered this 
demand with a demand of their own—the incorporation of an investment 
agenda into the WTO—despite the fact that the establishment of such a ba-
sic tenet of free trade should not require a quid pro quo. The several days of 
negotiation were simply too short a period of time to bridge their divergent 
stances. Hence, the call of the Doha Development Agenda was left unan-
swered and the global Gesellschaft remains flawed.  
III. SCRUTINIZING THE FLAWED ENTERPRISE OF GLOBAL 
GESELLSCHAFT: WHY AND HOW IT FAILED 
A. The Main Failure: Persistent Protectionism  
Although the origin of the global Gesellschaft (GATT 1947), is found in 
the painful historical lesson of the global economic balkanization that even-
tually contributed to World War II,138 old habits die hard. Political realities 
have demonstrated recidivistic patterns of protectionism. Accordingly, the 
global Gesellschaft operates in a schizophrenic manner where the official 
axiom of the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international com-
merce coexists with an anathematic protectionist phenomenon. It seems that 
GATT’s proverbial Odysseus tied his hands loosely enough to steer his 
course toward the Sirens of protectionism.  
Indeed, the very architecture of the global Gesellschaft is defenseless to 
mercantilism because trade negotiations are premised on the principle of 
reciprocity or quid pro quo. These negotiations produce a reciprocal ex-
change of concessions, based on a general assumption that exportation is 
good and importation is bad from the standpoint of creating national 
wealth.139 Simply put, the extent of market access to one country tends to 
depend on that to the other. This reciprocity certainly goes against an under-
lying theoretical proposition of free trade mandating even unilateral, volun-
tary trade liberalization for the liberalizing country’s own benefit.140 Under-
standably, yet still problematically, such a mantra does not appeal to politi-
cians who usually respond, and often pander, to their own domestic con-
stituencies under short-term election cycles.141 Frustratingly, even some 
  
 138. Catastrophically, major economies in the inter-war period responded to the global depression by 
a mutually destructive spiral of protectionism. GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, 
at 26-27. The U.S. opened the salvo by passing the notorious Smoot-Hawley Act in 1930, which caused 
a chain reaction of retaliation abroad. Id. at 27; see also GREIDER, supra note 9, at 43. 
 139. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 55, at 17. 
 140. See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 24-33 (1988) (discussing the “Intellectual Case for 
Unilateral Free Trade”). 
 141. See G. Edward Schuh, Developing Country Interests in WTO Agricultural Policy, in POLITICAL 
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intellectuals defend this distorted version of trade, which Paul Krugman 
aptly termed “pop internationalism.”142  
This reciprocal approach is particularly painful to poor countries who 
cannot bargain with rich countries on equal footing. For example, developed 
countries refuse to bargain over certain products that are being produced by 
developing countries under a comparative advantage, but which developed 
countries are nonetheless eager to protect for political reasons. These prod-
ucts include textiles and clothing,143 agricultural products,144 and other 
commodities produced through labor-intensive manufacturing processes.145 
As a result, the tariffs on certain basic products in developed countries, de-
spite several rounds of tariff reduction, are still higher—greater than fifteen 
percent—than on manufactured goods. This phenomenon is defined as a 
“tariff peak.”146 In the case of agricultural products, the tariff peak is so se-
vere that the average tariff for agricultural protection in developed countries 
is almost nine times higher than for manufacturing.147 In addition, tariff 
  
ECONOMY, supra note 44, at 446-47 (observing that protection breeds more protection because the 
benefits of protection are “soon capitalized into the structure of costs and thus seem to disappear and in 
turn to give rise to more pleas for additional protectionism”).  
 142. See generally PAUL KRUGMAN, POP INTERNATIONALISM (1996). Krugman trenchantly exposed 
several common misleading clichés of pop internationalism and illuminated why they were wrong. Paul 
R. Krugman, What Do Undergrads Need To Know About Trade?, Address Before the American Eco-
nomic Association (Jan. 5-7, 1993), in AM. ECON. REV., May 1993, at 23-26. 
 143. Cf. Michael Kitchen, Meetings Focus on Reform, Millennium Goals, UN WIRE, Sept. 30, 2002 
[hereinafter UN WIRE (Stern)] (citing World Bank Chief Economist Nicholas Stern who argued that “for 
every textile job saved in an industrialized country through the use of tariff barriers, 35 textile jobs are 
lost in low-income nations”), at http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20020930/29272_story.asp. 
 144. UNCTAD TDR 2002, supra note 17, at 35.  
While tariffs on many traditional primary commodities and agricultural raw materials are either zero or 
minimal in developed country markets, a number of “sensitive” products such as sugar, cocoa, rice and 
tobacco continue to face high barriers, and tariff escalation impedes diversification efforts. Subsidies to 
farmers in the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) further limit export opportunities to developing country producers. 
Id.; see also Kym Anderson, Bringing Discipline to Agricultural Policy Via the WTO, in A PRO-ACTIVE 
AGENDA, supra note 20, at 26-28. 
 145. Developing countries resented the developed countries’ encroachment into the developing 
countries’ comparative advantage. In one display of this frustration, Uruguay sued 15 developed coun-
tries before a GATT panel in the early sixties for their protectionist trade restrictions, such as the EC 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Though the panel refused to rule on some sensitive legal issues, it 
did recommend that all violations admitted or self-confessed by the defendants be settled or removed by 
March 1, 1963. Report of the Panel on Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, Nov. 15, 1962, GATT 
B.I.S.D. 11S/95 (1963). See also HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 82, at 
445-47. 
 146. WTO, Understanding the WTO: Developing Countries, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e 
/whatis_e/tif_e/dev4_e.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004); Global Trade Liberalization, supra note 17, at 
III. For instance, the U.S. has tariff peaks on about three hundred individual products, while its average 
tariff is only five percent. Id. 
 147. Global Trade Liberalization, supra note 17, at III. To make matters worse, agricultural subsidies 
in developed countries, which amount to two thirds of Africa’s total GDP, also undermine developing 
countries’ exports and development. Id. See also Hans Binswanger & Ernst Lutz, Agricultural Trade 
Barriers, Trade Negotiations, and the Interests of Developing Countries (2000) (arguing that developed 
countries’ export subsidies in agriculture should be removed; domestic producer subsidies and bound 
tariffs should be reduced; access under tariff quotas should be increased; and tariff escalation on proc-
essed agricultural products should be terminated), available at http://www.unctad-10.org/pdfs/ux_tdxrt1 
d8.en.pdf.  
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protection of manufactured goods in developed countries tends to increase 
in proportion to the sophistication of the manufacturing process.148 This 
“tariff escalation” discourages developing countries from diversifying or 
upgrading their exports to “higher value-added products.”149 Undoubtedly, 
these protectionist phenomena impede and undermine the economic devel-
opment of developing countries.150 
In addition to tariff protection, developed countries have responded to 
fierce lobbying by domestic competitors and have systematically blocked 
the import of “low-skill, labor-intensive goods.”151 When such goods are 
uncomfortably successful in the developed countries’ markets, the respec-
tive governments have not hesitated to circumvent or even override the 
GATT obligations, invoking for example Voluntary Export Restraints 
(VERs), which are concluded in a less-than-voluntary manner.152 One of the 
most notorious VERs is the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA),153 which re-
  
 148. Global Trade Liberalization, supra note 17, at III.  
 149. Id. 
 150. The Monterrey Consensus, which is the result of the recent International Conference on Financ-
ing for Development held in Mexico in March 2002, provided a panoply of areas in which developing 
countries suffer from the protectionist trade policies of developed countries. The Consensus stated: 
We acknowledge the issues of particular concern to developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition in international trade to enhance their capacity to finance their devel-
opment, including trade barriers, trade-distorting subsidies and other trade-distorting meas-
ures, particularly in sectors of special export interest to developing countries, including agri-
culture; the abuse of anti-dumping measures; technical barriers and sanitary and phytosani-
tary measures; trade liberalization in labour intensive manufacturers; trade liberalization in 
agricultural products; trade in services; tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation, as well 
as non-tariff barriers; the movement of natural persons . . . . 
U.N. International Conference on Financing for Development, Adoption of the Monterey Consensus, 
A/Conf/198/3 (2002), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/aconf198-3.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). 
See also African Finance Ministers Call for Rich Countries to Open Markets, UN WIRE, Aug. 1, 2002, 
at http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20020801/28049_story.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). Interestingly, 
the Oxfam International, an NGO, invented a Double Standards Index (DSI) in order to “quantify the 
gap” between free trade principles promoted by developed countries and their “actual protectionist 
policies.” Oxfam Report Highlights Hypocrisies in Global Trading System, 6 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE 
NEWS DIG. 14 (2002), available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-04-16/story4.htm (last visited Feb. 
23, 2004). 
 151. WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS, supra note 54, at 299; see also Gerald K. Helleiner, The New 
Industrial Protectionism and the Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THIRD WORLD 
DEVELOPMENT (Pradip K. Ghosh ed., 1984) (criticizing developed countries’ “new protectionism” in 
specific labor-intensive sectors in which developing countries retain a definite comparative advantage as 
beyond a general “economic nationalism”). This systematic protection against developing countries’ 
exports can be found not only in multilateral but also in regional trade relations. Cf. BELA BALASSA, 
THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 118-19 (1981) (discussing “inter-
national cartels” and “market-sharing” in some industries, including textiles and shoes, resulting from 
new protectionist moves by developed countries which feared competition from developing countries). 
See generally Stephany Griffith-Jones, Economic Integration in Europe: Implications for Developing 
Countries, in THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE, supra note 18, at 33-49.  
 152. Hugh Corbet, Preface to HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 55, at xiv. 
 153. The MFA is an agreement between nine importing developed country parties and 31 exporting 
developing countries which limits the exportation of textiles and clothing through various instruments, 
such as Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) and quotas. THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 
supra note 82, at 310. For an economic analysis on the impact of the MFA, see Yongzheng Yang, The 
Impact of MFA Phasing Out on World Clothing and Textile Markets, 30 J. DEV. STUD. 892, 908-09 
(1994). Yang concluded that the MFA’s “dampening effect” on trade was substantial, though its effect 
on global production and consumption was small. Id. Yang also suggested that the MFA be eliminated as 
 
File: TheWTO'sGemeinschaft Created on: 5/31/2007 9:32:00 AM Last Printed: 6/11/2007 10:58:00 AM 
2004] The WTO’s Gemeinschaft 511 
stricted nearly eighty percent of U.S. potential imports in textile and apparel 
from the LDCs in the early eighties.154 Likewise, even in the unilateral re-
duction of tariffs for developing countries, as seen in the GSP, donor (de-
veloped) countries deliberately excluded from the system those products 
which competed with similar domestic products but tended to be produced 
in poor countries because of their labor-intensive nature.155 Surprisingly, on 
average less than thirty percent of all dutiable imports from developing 
countries actually benefit from GSP programs.156 
This persistent trend towards protectionism by rich countries is particu-
larly problematic if one considers that the notion of comparative advantage 
is dynamic. That is to say, as a country’s general economic situation im-
proves, that country’s comparative advantage tends to shift away from la-
bor-intensive sectors to more capital or technology-intensive ones.157 This 
transformation of comparative advantage has been demonstrated by devel-
opments in East Asian countries, such as Korea and Taiwan, in the 1970s 
and 1980s,158 and by more dramatic performances on the part of new global-
izers, such as China, India, and Mexico, in the 1990s.159 Nonetheless, sig-
nificant protectionism on the part of developed countries continues to pre-
vent other developing countries from capitalizing on their comparative ad-
vantages and from reaching higher levels of economic development. As a 
  
quickly as possible because the liberalization of the MFA would mean a “Pareto improvement” for all 
participants. Id. at 89. Regarding the political economic aspects of textiles trade, see generally VINOD K. 
AGGARWAL, LIBERAL PROTECTIONISM: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF ORGANIZED TEXTILE TRADE 
(1985); and CARL B. HAMILTON, TEXTILES TRADE AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ELIMINATING 
THE MULTI-FIBRE ARRANGEMENT IN THE 1990S (1990). 
 154. WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS, supra note 54, at 299.  
 155. Id. at 300. Section 503(c)(2) of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(2) (2001), 
articulates the “competitive need test” by which any GSP beneficiary may lose its status when it is 
deemed to enjoy sufficient competitiveness in the U.S. market. LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 57, at 
1192. Though its main purpose is to benefit other not-so-competitive countries, it can be abused to 
benefit domestic industries that produce competitive products. In addition, this exclusionary practice not 
only undermines the actual effect of preferential aid programs, such as GSPs, but also is a disservice to 
economic justice. Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing World, 
21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 975, 1033-35 (2000). 
 156. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 94, at 385. 
 157. According to the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem, which is basically grounded on the Ricardian model, 
countries will export products which use the factor of production which abounds and thus is relatively 
cheap. See JAN S. HOGENDORN & WILSON B. BROWN, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 229-30 
(1979). 
 158. WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS, supra note 54, at 171-72. However, some observers make 
reservations on the “sustainability and generalizability” of the East Asian experience. See THE 
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 82, at 394. Some may even contend that the East 
Asian economies have been so successful not because of classical trade liberalization, but because of 
proper protectionism or managed trade. Cf. Trade, Civil Society Decision-Makers Convene at WTO 
Symposium, 6 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. 16 (2002), available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/0 
2-05-02/story1.htm. After all, the speed, sequence and modalities of trade liberalization (which should 
be applied on a case-by-case basis), as well as the socio-cultural characteristics, are determinative of the 
success of trade policies. This may be why the East Asian examples are often hard to generalize as 
development prescriptions.  
 159. GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 8. 
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result, many developing countries remain trapped in their initial stage of 
development.160 
Admittedly, certain developing countries have only themselves to blame 
for limitations on market access to developed countries. Originally, devel-
oping countries had been persuaded by developed countries to tolerate the 
latter’s trade barriers over basic goods, such as agricultural products or tex-
tiles, in exchange for GATT exemptions. This enabled developing countries 
to pursue their own models of developmental strategies outside the legal 
terrain of GATT, such as import-substitution policies. However, this “Faust-
ian bargain” 161 turned out to be disastrous to most developing countries that 
accepted it, because the cost incurred by the limited market access had be-
come too high.162 Moreover, the putative benefit of developmental strategies 
that remained outside of GATT proved to be a mirage.163 Instead, those 
strategies, as seen in the case of import-substitution policies, generated 
counter-productive effects, in that special interest groups began to form 
within developing countries at the expense of general, structural reforms.164 
Nonetheless, in the case of transition economies, developed countries 
seem to be more vulnerable to criticism than in the aforementioned case of 
the Faustian bargain. In fact, those economies, mostly concentrated in East-
ern and Central Europe, were in an advantageous position to pursue liberal, 
free trade policies, since no prominent vested interests prevailed after the 
centrally planned economies collapsed.165 However, as soon as these transi-
tion economies restructured their domestic laws and procedures towards the 
open market system, they discovered that rich countries, who untiringly 
preached the value of free trade to them, actually maintained heavy trade 
  
 160. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY BANK & WORLD BANK, MARKET ACCESS FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRY EXPORTS—SELECTED ISSUES 14 (2002) (observing that “[t]he pattern of protection creates 
particular hurdles for countries taking the first steps up the technology ladder”), at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/ma/2002/eng/092602.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). 
 161. THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 82, at 368 (quoting Sidney Weintraub 
who argued that developing countries received special and differential treatment which freed them from 
the legal disciplines of GATT in return for allowing their most competitive export products to be ex-
cluded from trade preferences). 
 162. Corbet, supra note 151, at xiv; see also Murray Gibbs, Special and Differential Treatment in the 
Context of Globalization (Paper Presented in the G15 Symposium on Special and Differential Treatment 
in the WTO Agreements in New Delhi, Dec. 10, 1998) (listing a variety of increasingly negative dis-
crimination by developed countries, such as VERs, anti-dumping duties, and MFAs, which eventually 
outweighed positive discrimination under special and differential treatment), available at http://www.wt 
o.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/sem01_e/gibbs_e.doc. In the same context, WTO Director General Moore 
noted that potential benefits from special and differential (S&D) treatments for developing countries 
might have been outweighed by exemptions that had in practice favored developed countries: something 
that may be called “reverse S&D.” Ablasse Ouedraogo, Seminar on Special and Differential Treatment 
for Developing Countries, Closing Remarks (July 30, 2000), at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/se 
m01_e/sdtrem_e.htm. 
 163. THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra note 76, at 408. 
 164. See WTO Committee on Trade and Development, 28th Sess., Note on the Meeting of March 10, 
2000, WT/COMTD/M/28/Add.1 (Aug. 2, 2000), available at http;//docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/ 
t/WT/COMTD/M28A1.doc.  
 165. Jaroslaw Pietras, The Role of the WTO for Economies in Transition, in INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION, supra note 94, at 359. 
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barriers against their exports, such as agricultural products or clothing.166 
This not only frustrated the new governments but also compelled them to 
imitate protectionist trade policies pursued by wealthy nations, thus raising 
new trade barriers.167 In other situations, EU member states even pressed 
transition economies to follow elements of the EU’s own pre-existing pro-
tectionist trade regime, such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), as a 
condition on their objective to “rejoin Europe.”168 Accession to the EU, of 
course, is one of the highest political priorities of many transition econo-
mies, which made it difficult to reject such conditionality.169 Frustratingly, 
this forced spiral of protectionist dynamics, through the expansion of the 
CAP, is a serious impediment to the economic development of non-member 
developing countries whose major exports are agricultural products.  
Finally, the anti-dumping (AD) system merits some discussion with re-
spect to its protectionist nature and adverse effect on development.170 The 
low price of foreign imports is often associated with the theory of compara-
tive advantage since cheap products usually result from cheap factors of 
production, such as labor. The anti-competitive rationale of the AD system, 
that is, “predatory pricing,” is unpersuasive because cheap imports from the 
poor do not, and cannot, drive big companies out of their markets. There-
fore, AD rules lack all economic justification.171 Nonetheless, the AD sys-
tem, as a contingent protectionist instrument, is widely used to curb the flow 
of cheap imports into domestic markets and thus continuously hinders de-
veloping countries producing these products.172 The actual and potential 
damage the AD system inflicts on developing countries is illustrated by the 
fact that the usual suspects alleged to be dumping are developing countries 
with insufficient market power to exclude competitors, while their accusers 
tend to be developed countries.173 In particular, some developing countries 
  
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 360. 
 169. Id. 
 170. UNCTAD TDR 2002, supra note 17, at 36. 
Despite efforts to tighten the rules on the application of anti-dumping procedures and meas-
ures, such measures can be relatively easily applied, and they have become a preferred tool of 
protection used by many developed countries and an increasing number of developing coun-
tries. Even if duties are finally not imposed, such procedures often have a dampening effect 
on trade, prompting importers to seek alternative sources of supply. Moreover, responding to 
an investigation can create a huge burden for affected countries. 
Id. 
 171. GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 61. 
 172. In the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code, Article 13 included a special consideration for devel-
oping countries in the form of “constructive remedies” to mitigate any devastating impact that AD 
measures might cause them. THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 82, at 372. How-
ever, this general provision failed to be effectively implemented in the developed countries’ domestic 
legal systems. Id. 
 173. GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 61 (observing that developing 
countries bear a disproportionate burden of AD measures in both rich-country markets and other devel-
oping countries vis-à-vis developed countries); see also ARVIND PANAGARIYA, THE MILLENNIUM 
ROUND AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: NEGOTIATING STRATEGIES AND AREAS OF BENEFITS 24 (2000); 
The Dumping Dilemma; Rising Protectionism, ECONOMIST, June 1, 2002, at 91. 
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are haunted by the possible surge of AD measures by developed countries in 
the textiles and clothing sector when MFA-related quotas are eventually 
phased out under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.174  
The perils of AD rules do not stop there. In stark contrast with their 
anti-competitive, market-protecting rationale, AD rules create anti-
competitive situations such as “cartelization.”175 Through prosecuting low 
prices, AD rules produce the same effect of fixing prices.176 Moreover, even 
a threat of AD suits discourages new producers from attempting to enter the 
market.177 As Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan trenchantly 
observed, AD rules are “just simple guises for inhibiting competition,” de-
spite their hypocritical disguise in the name of “fair trade.”178 What is more 
demoralizing is the AD rules’ contagion effect or negative learning effect. 
Developing countries have now begun to imitate the developed countries’ 
penchant for AD suits for their own protectionist purposes under the subter-
fuge of a defensive attack.  
In sum, along with the Faustian Bargain discussed above, the AD rules 
tend to convert the poor from victims to accomplices in distorting and cor-
rupting the global Gesellschaft’s original goal of promoting free trade. 
B. The New Complication: Regulatory Unilateralism  
The global Gesellschaft in its original form was mainly designed to 
tackle traditional trade barriers, such as tariffs and quotas. Recently, how-
ever, developed country governments, under the banner of the welfare state, 
have been pressured to respond to ever-growing regulatory demands on 
various issues of social hygiene, such as human health, public safety, and 
environmental protection. No matter how legitimate these domestic regula-
tions may be, they often constitute a new form of trade barrier—Non-Tariff 
Barriers (NTBs). For example, the proliferation of domestic regulations in 
the rich nations affects poor nations most painfully when they are denied 
market access because their exports fail to conform to high and costly regu-
latory standards imposed by the rich nations.  
China, for instance, increasingly uses asbestos, not only in the construc-
tionsector but also in manufacturing, despite known health risks.179 Some 
developed countries, including those of the EU, strictly ban any use, mar-
  
 174. Vangelis Vitalis, The Development Impact of Developed-World Policies on Developing Coun-
tries: The Case of Trade (Paper Presented at the Global Development Technical Workshop, Cairo, 
Egypt, Jan. 16-17, 2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/17/1680402.pdf.  
 175. Richard J. Pierce Jr., Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating Cartelization, 67 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 725, 739 (2000). 
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. at 740. 
 178. Id. at 725.  
 179. In Brief, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, Geneva), Oct. 19, 1998, available at http://www.newsbulletin.org/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin 
_ID=14&issue_ID=1165&browse=1&SID=#In%20Brief. 
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keting, or importation of asbestos and asbestos-based products.180 However, 
as a developing country, China cannot afford to switch to costly asbestos 
substitutes and thus loses access to foreign markets. Another example of the 
developmentally fatal effects of regulatory unilateralism can be found in the 
recent debate on genetically modified foods. Confronting widespread pov-
erty, as well as a grim Malthusian scenario,181 GM technology may revolu-
tionize the current farming process and contribute greatly to increased food 
production.182 Yet, some developed countries, including EU countries, 
strongly oppose GM foods from a regulatory or socio-cultural perspec-
tive.183 Regardless of the legitimacy of these highly precautionary policies, 
they deter the economic development of poor countries desiring to use this 
technology to boost their exports. Tönnies would have found another Ge-
sellschaftian trait in these examples: the rich forcing the poor to conform to 
high standards set by the rich.184  
In sum, regulatory unilateralism puts the global Gesellschaft in a di-
lemma. On the one hand, a failure to respond to contemporary regulatory 
demand would result in political backlash within developed countries, ulti-
mately diminishing its legitimacy. In this regard, many critics, including 
many NGOs, fear that a pro-trade ethos embedded in the global Gesellschaft 
is likely to lead states to introduce competitive strategies based on an effi-
ciency-driven philosophy, which is “dysfunctional or at best disruptive,”185 
and will eventually engage them in a regulatory “race to the bottom.”186  
  
 180. See, e.g., Appellate Body and Panel Report, Measures Affecting the Prohibition of Asbestos and 
Asbestos Products, as amended, WT/DS135 (Apr. 5, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop 
_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm. 
 181. It is estimated that an additional two billion people will be born within the next thirty years, 
which necessitates that the human race double the current level of food production. WTO, Mike Moore, 
Prospects for the Developing Countries for the Next Round, Address to the Development Committee of 
the European Parliament (Feb. 21, 2000), at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm25_e.ht 
m. 
 182. New Report Cites Importance of Technology to Poor States, UN WIRE, July 9, 2001, at http://w 
ww.unwire.org/unwire/20010709/15881_story.asp. 
 183. EU Rules in Dispute; Trade War Brewing?, UN WIRE, June 16, 1999, at http://www.uwire.org/u 
nwire/19990616/3219_story.asp.  
 184. THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS, supra note 6. 
 185. William W. Bratton et al., Introduction: Regulatory Competition and Institutional Evolution, in 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC 
REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 1, 3 (William W. Bratton et al. eds., 1996). 
 186. However, many economists reject this notion. See, e.g., John Douglas Wilson, Capital Mobility 
and Environmental Standards: Is There a Theoretical Basis for a Race to the Bottom?, in FAIR TRADE 
AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 393, 423 (Jagdish 
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) [hereinafter FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION I] (observing 
that a “race” is not an accurate description of the behaviors of independent governments, and that this 
race model fails to explain the absence of more direct means to attract foreign firms, such as subsidies or 
a lower tax rate on capital gains); Arik Levinson, Environmental Regulations and Industry Location: 
International and Domestic Evidence, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION I, supra, at 429, 453 (em-
phasizing the lack of economic evidence to support such a claim). In contrast, many others recognize the 
opposite phenomenon of “race to the top.” See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International 
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 
61 (2002); Patrick B. Griffin, The Delaware Effect: Keeping the Tiger in Its Cage: The European Ex-
perience of Mutual Recognition in Financial Services, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 337, 340 (2001); ADRIENNE 
HÉRITIER ET AL., RINGING THE CHANGES IN EUROPE: REGULATORY COMPETITION AND THE 
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On the other hand, if developed countries were to saddle developing 
countries with the former’s high standards without due regard for the latter’s 
incapability, developing countries’ access to developed countries’ markets 
would be severely damaged, thwarting the developing countries’ economic 
growth and their integration into the global market.187 The bottom line is 
that, due to their limited financial and technical capacity, most developing 
countries—and particularly the least-developed countries—cannot afford to 
comply with the demanding and sophisticated regulations enacted by devel-
oped countries.188 Under these circumstances, forced compliance tends to 
  
TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE: BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY 1 (1996). 
 187. See Jim Rollo & L. Alan Winters, Subsidiarity and Governance Challenges for the WTO: Envi-
ronmental and Labour Standards, in A PRO-ACTIVE AGENDA, supra note 20, at 185, 186 (observing that 
enforcing labor and environmental standards through trade sanctions will result not only in the malad-
ministration of these standards, but also in the loss of traditional economic benefits through the trade 
liberalization flowing from GATT); Robert M. Stern, Labor Standards and Trade, in NEW DIRECTIONS 
IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 425, 437 (Marco 
Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000) (arguing that “the surest way to achieve higher labor standards” 
in poor countries is for rich countries to open their markets and encourage the economic development of 
poor countries); THIRD WORLD NETWORK, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: A DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE 15 (2001) (arguing that trade-related 
issues such as health and the environment should be dealt with not by the WTO but by relevant special-
ized international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nation 
Environmental Program (UNEP), respectively), available at http://www.undp.org/mainundp/propoor/do 
cs/multitradesystem.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2004); Roessler, supra note 90, at 514 (arguing that the 
integration of certain regulatory subject matters, such as labor and environment, into the multilateral 
trade order undermined both trade and non-trade objectives); Jose E. Alvarez, How Not to Link: Institu-
tional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade Regime, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 4-15 (2001) (criticizing an 
effort to link “human rights obligations” to trade disciplines); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: 
Of Constituents, Competence and Coherence, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 979, 1009 (2001) (discover-
ing the conceptual as well as practical difficulties of incorporating “national interest” (non-WTO law) 
and “comparative advantage” (WTO law), considering the fundamentally different and conflicting as-
sumptions of the two); Gregory Shaffer, WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U.S. Domestic Politics 
on Trade-Labor, Trade-Environment Linkages for the WTO’s Future, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 608, 647-
48 (2000) (observing that any linkage effort by developed countries would be futile without significant 
financial assistance to developing countries to help them implement certain regulatory obligations de-
manded by the developed countries); Hal S. Shapiro, A New Liberal Trade Policy Foundation, 9 ILSA J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 431, 432-33 (2003) (arguing that, in the interest of developing countries, liberals 
should stop promoting “linkages” between trade and other social issues such as labor and the environ-
ment, and instead advocate freer trade, with separate U.S. government initiatives (“carrots” rather than 
“sticks”) to promote development in developing countries); Laurent A. Ruessmann, Putting the Precau-
tionary Principle in Its Place: Parameters for the Proper Application of a Precautionary Approach and 
the Implications for Developing Countries in Light of the Doha WTO Ministerial, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 905, 938-39 (2002) (submitting that the EC’s effort to strengthen a “precautionary principle” in 
WTO law is misguided and would be prejudicial to the interests of developing countries). But cf. James 
Thuo Gathii, Re-Characterizing the Social in the Constitutionlization of the WTO: A Preliminary Analy-
sis, 7-SPG WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 137, 138 (2001) (arguing that “social issues should be re-
conceptualized to reflect the proper theoretical premise of the actual reality of the international trading 
regime”). 
 188. See Spencer Henson et al., The Impact of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures on Developing 
Country Exports of Agricultural and Food Products (Paper Presented at the Conference on Agriculture 
and the New Trade Agenda in the WTO 2000 Negotiations, Geneva, Switzerland, Oct. 1-2, 1999) (ex-
ploring the impact of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures on developing 
countries’ exports of agricultural and food products into the developed countries’ markets), available at 
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/essdext.nsf/12DocByUnid/58DFE7F9DFBBE1615256C85006EF3
43/$FILE/henson_et%%0.pdf; John S. Wilson, Standards, Regulation, and Trade: WTO Rules and 
Developing Country Concerns, in HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 428, 437 (pointing to a “common con-
straint” that developing countries face, the “[l]ack of modern technical infrastructure and capacity to 
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offset any comparative advantage that developing countries naturally retain 
vis-à-vis developed countries. Furthermore, regulatory unilateralism is eas-
ily abused and breeds camouflaged forms of protection, as manifested by 
“green” (environmental regulation-driven) or “blue” (labor regulation-
driven) protectionism.189 
Yet this problem cannot be effectively tackled through the traditional 
approach to development that focuses mainly on preferential tariffs, such as 
GSPs. The root of the problem is inextricably linked to a far more profound 
premise, namely the tension between regulatory autonomy in developed 
countries and trade concerns in developing countries. This tension trans-
forms the contours of development in international trade and compels us to 
seek a new paradigm. The new paradigm is different from the current Ge-
sellschaftian model centered on such premises as negotiation, bargain, and 
contract. Even rich countries should include poor countries’ circumstances 
in their policy equations as relevant parameters, not only from a philan-
thropic standpoint, but also for the sake of the very success of their own 
regulatory policies. Unfortunately, the current Gesellschaftian structure of 
international trade is incapable of materializing this global empathy. 
C. Evanescent Initiatives: Rhetoric Without Action 
Although a plethora of provisions and texts have been devoted to devel-
opment assistance under the WTO rules, including the Doha Declaration, 
most are vague and hortatory and lack both concreteness and teeth. While 
references to the consideration of particular interests or special needs of 
developing countries frequently appear in those legal documents,190 they 
  
engage in international standards-development activities”); see also STANDARDS & GLOBAL TRADE: A 
VOICE FOR AFRICA xxxiii-xliii (John S. Wilson and Victor O. Abiola eds., 2003). 
 189. Sometimes governments disguise their protectionist intent by using these seemingly legitimate 
regulatory objectives. Such disguised protection is often called “protectionism,” in contrast with direct 
“protection.” OECD, FOOD SAFETY AND QUALITY ISSUES: TRADE CONSIDERATIONS 53 (1999). See 
GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 64-65. Based on the possibility of this 
protectionist abuse of domestic regulations, many scholars express a negative view of the so-called 
“linkage” idea that aims to attain certain regulatory goals by proactively linking them to international 
trade disciplines. See T.N. SRINIVASAN, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING 
SYSTEM: FROM THE GATT TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE FUTURE 73 (1998). As Srinivasan elo-
quently stated: 
The demand of developed countries for a social clause for enforcing a set of core standards 
on which there is no political consensus through the threat of trade sanctions is seen by many 
developing countries as driven largely by crass protectionist motives. Since increased compe-
tition from low-cost imports from developing countries imposes an adjustment cost in terms 
of declines in output and employment in import-competing industries of developed countries, 
forcing exporting countries to raise their labor standards in the expectation that their costs of 
production will rise will thus shift most, if not all, of the costs of adjustment to developing 
countries. Clearly, a social clause is nothing but a thinly veiled protectionist device in such a 
context. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 190. See, e.g., WTO Committee on Trade and Development, WTO Measures Relating to Developing 
Country Members: Note by the Secretariat, WT/COMTD/W/10 (Nov. 8, 1995) [hereinafter WTO Com-
mittee on Trade and Development (Fourth Session)], available at http://www.wto.org/english/traptop_e/ 
devel_e/teccop_e/wlo_e.doc; Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, WTO AGREEMENT, Annex 1A, supra 
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accomplish little in practice because no criteria for consideration is pro-
vided. Thus, the whole assistance regime remains unilateral and at the 
mercy of donor countries. Likewise, although those provisions commit the 
rich to the provision of advice and assistance to their poor counterparts, no 
further explanations follow as to how to assist the poor in building their 
administrative and regulatory capacity. Not surprisingly, the result is that 
many suspect such commitments are mere lip-service.191 Moreover, most 
instruments for capacity-building assistance, such as training courses, semi-
nars, and workshops, tend to be general or inspirational rather than problem-
driven.192 These instruments are also applied irregularly and anecdotally, 
mostly due to a lack of resources.193 With these predicaments, it would be 
very difficult, though not impossible, for the poor to succeed in building to 
their capacity. 
In general, the lack of political will among the rich countries has led to 
a steady decline in the level of Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
since 1992.194 This funding restraint is reflected through the technical assis-
tance activities in the WTO Secretariat, which have become dramatically 
“overstretched and underfinanced.”195 For instance, only $16 million is cur-
rently devoted to technical cooperation missions.196 Even the once vibrant 
IF initiative has failed to secure adequate funding.197 The lack of stable and 
  
note 1, art. 1:4 (considering “particular interests”) [hereinafter ATC]; SPS Agreement, supra note 115, 
art. 10:1 (considering “special needs” in the preparation and application of SPS measures); TBT Agree-
ment, supra note 116, art. 12:2 (considering special needs in the implementation); Agreement on Imple-
mentation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Annex 1 A, WTO 
AGREEMENT, supra note 1, art. 15 (regarding special situations in considering anti-dumping measures); 
Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 1A, WTO AGREEMENT, supra note 1, art. 20(c) (considering of spe-
cial and differential treatment). 
 191. See, e.g., SPS Agreement, supra note 115, art. 9:2 (providing assistance where substantial in-
vestments are required for complying with trading partners’ requirements); TBT Agreement, supra note 
116, art. 11:4 (providing advice and assistance for “the establishment of bodies for the assessment of 
conformity with standards”). See generally WTO Committee on Trade and Development (Fourth Ses-
sion), supra note 190. 
 192. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, supra note 91, at 21. 
 193. See Mary E. Footer, The WTO, Developing Countries and Technical Assistance for Trade Law 
Reform, in GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION 353, 366 (Julio Faundez et al. eds., 
2000) (observing that WTO technical assistance may be “inherently contradictory” and “poorly co-
ordinated”). 
 194. Agenda 21 Report, supra note 64, para. 7; see also Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 437 (observing that 
“aid per capita to the developing world [fell] by nearly a third in the 1990s”). 
 195. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, supra note 91, at 18; see also THE WTO AND BEYOND, 
supra note 76, at 398; Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Evolving Multilateral Trade System in the New Mil-
lennium, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 419, 444 (2001) (observing that the WTO’s budget constraints 
make it less able to assist developing countries in the areas of “[i]nstitutional building, capacity building, 
[and] human resource training” than other international institutions, such as the World Bank and the 
IMF); cf. Constantine Michalopoulos, The Developing Countries in the WTO, 22 THE WORLD ECON. 
117, 142 (1999) (arguing that developing countries should actively participate in the WTO Committee 
on Budget, Finance and Administration and raise their collective voice to secure necessary resources for 
development assistance).  
 196. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, supra note 91, at 18.  
 197. Id. at 23. 
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predictable budgets prevents technical assistance activities from being de-
signed in an operable fashion over a long-term period.198  
Likewise, the recent Doha Declaration, despite its ambitious and prom-
ising framework, will not be effective by itself. Words and plans must be 
accompanied by actions, and actions must be funded by the major devel-
oped countries if they are to materialize. Although the United States re-
cently pledged an additional $5 billion of foreign aid over the next three 
years—a step in the right direction—this amount should be put into perspec-
tive. As former U.S. President Jimmy Carter pointed out, the current level 
of U.S. ODA spending amounts only to one-third of its spending in the 
1970s.199 More frustratingly, even if the rich countries were to undertake 
more aid programs, these scarce resources would probably be spent on new 
issues in which the rich countries have heavily vested interests, such as 
competition and investment200—areas that do not signifincantly impact the 
poor countries’ economic development. In sum, under the current Gesell-
schaftian structure of the global trading system in which helping other na-
tions is translated and conducted only through the concept of a donation, not 
a duty, it is impossible to expect that true development assistance will mate-
rialize into actual change.  
IV. TOWARD THE WTO’S GEMEINSCHAFT 
A. The WTO’s Gemeinschaft: Its Construct and the Global Empathy 
Despite the varying administrative instruments assiduously adopted and 
applied for the enhancement of global welfare, the nature of the global Ge-
sellschaft tends to solidify the stratification between the rich and the poor.201 
This troubling phenomenon, which John Rawls describes as “unjust,”202 has 
the additional effect of stigmatizing poor nations in general. This poses the 
question of whether the Gesellschaft should be expanded and strengthened 
to the extent that it can eventually deliver, backed by an authority with an 
enforcement mechanism, effective (re-)distributional justice? In addition to 
being practically infeasible, this Austinian World Government as a Super-
Gesellschaft has long been rejected by many philosophers, including Im-
manuel Kant and Emmerich de Vattel. Kant warns, and John Rawls follows, 
that the World Government would turn to either a global tyranny or a mass 
chaos.203 Vattel also objected to the civitatis maximae which Christian 
  
 198. Press Release, WTO, WTO General Council Informal Meeting (Mar. 28, 2000), http://www.wto 
.org/english/news_e/pres00_e/pr173_e.htm. 
 199. Jim Wurst, Rich Countries Lauded, Criticized Over New Pledges, UN WIRE, Mar. 20, 2002, at 
http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20020320/24888_story.asp. 
 200. See Millions Pledged in Technical Assistance Present New Challenges to WTO, 6 BRIDGES 
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. 9 (2002), available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-03-12/story1.htm. 
 201. THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS, supra note 6. 
 202. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 114 (2002).  
 203. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795), available at http://w 
ww.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm. Instead, Kant envisioned a “Federation of Free States.” 
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Wolff proposed, because he feared that small nations would be dwarfed by 
big ones in such a republic.204  
This dilemma invokes the consideration of the notion of Gemeinschaft 
as a solution for the problematic Gesellschaft. Tönnies maintains that the 
only way to save the decaying Gesellschaft is to revive the seeds of Ge-
meinschaft,205 in particular the “Gemeinschaft of [M]ind.”206 Therefore, 
Gemeinschaft is an alternative, not a regression, even to Tönnies.207 Per-
haps, the nostalgic appeal of Gemeinschaft both as “a symbol and aspira-
tion” derives naturally from our very humanness that seeks various social 
relationships such as mutual concern and support.208 Nonetheless, Tönnies’ 
typological and highly connotative original approach suffers from binarism. 
Most of all, such an approach overlooks the fact that the dividing line of the 
concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft is not as bright as Tönnies dem-
onstrates theoretically.209 Any Gemeinschaft may hold some attributes or 
qualities of Gesellschaft and vice versa. In other words, there may be a Ge-
meinschaftian Gesellschaft or a Gesellschaftian Gemeinschaft.  
Steven Brint attempts to overcome this theoretical shortcoming and bet-
ter define the appropriate coordinates of the Gemeinschaft. Brint employs 
Emile Durkheim’s “disaggregating” methodology, perceiving community 
not as a physical entity, but as a set of variable properties of human interac-
tion which can be discovered in Tönnies’ metropolis as well as the classical 
loci of Gemeinschaft, such as rural hamlets.210 Of those interactive, com-
municative Gemeinschaftian properties, four variables are particularly per-
tinent and useful in constructing the WTO’s Gemeinschaft out of its Gesell-
schaftian template: “dense and demanding social ties”; “ritual occasions”; 
“perceptions of similarity with the physical characteristics, expressive style, 
way of life, or historical experience of others”; and “common beliefs in an 
idea system, a moral order, an institution, or a group.”211  
The first variable, “dense and demanding social ties,” can be witnessed 
in an incremental fashion in the contemporary global trading landscape that 
is both highly interdependent and integrated. Although such interdepend-
ence and integration is primarily centered on economic and materialistic 
  
Id. See also RAWLS, supra note 202, at 36.  
 204. See Robert Trout, Vattel’s Natural Law, [hereinafter Vattel’s Natural Law] available at http://ea 
st_west_dialogue.tripod.com/vattel/id6.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2004). 
 205. THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS, supra note 6. 
 206. Reimer, supra note 33, at 229; THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMMUNITY, supra note 33, at 13-20. 
 207. Steven Brint, Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Con-
cept, 19 SOC. THEORY 1, 2 (2001).  
 208. Id. at 1. But cf. Eisabeth Zoller, Institutional Aspects of International Governance, 3 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 121, 123 (1995) (rejecting the possibility of an “international community” and 
instead positing the notion of “international society” on the ground that the international society lacks 
the “commonness” which can only be found in “national communities”).  
 209. Brint, supra note 207, at 3. 
 210. Brint observes that this disaggregating approach has been “followed up in productive ways by 
many sociologists” such as “Robert K. Merton, Erving Goffman, Travis Hirschi, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, 
and William Julius Wilson.” Id. 
 211. Id. at 3-4.  
File: TheWTO'sGemeinschaft Created on: 5/31/2007 9:32:00 AM Last Printed: 6/11/2007 10:58:00 AM 
2004] The WTO’s Gemeinschaft 521 
aspects inherent in an ever-expanding market, the very frustration of the 
Gesellschaftian failure in addressing social problems such as poverty and 
development disparity calls for more social ties to embrace and fix the fail-
ure. The original WTO architecture reveals such a social consciousness in 
its preamble.212 The subsequent initiative represented by the Doha Devel-
opment Round (DDR)213 further promotes certain social connectedness 
within the system. The WTO also highlights inclusiveness by warning 
against the phenomenon of the marginalization of its poorest members and 
urges other members to accommodate those poorest members through de-
velopment assistance.214 Even outside the institutional purview of the WTO, 
a variety of capacity-building or other development-oriented attempts, such 
as the “Global Compact,”215 are being made toward building these social 
ties through the medium of inter-governmental or non-governmental or-
ganizations. 
The second and third variables, “ritual occasions” and “perceptions of 
similarity with the physical characteristics, expressive style, way of life, or 
historical experience of others,”216 may be found in the WTO’s membership 
structure. Members are entitled, and in a sense privileged, to participate in a 
variety of ritual occasions, such as various committee and council meetings 
under the auspices of the WTO. These ritual occasions nurture a sense of 
belonging and group identity.217 Similarly, common modus operandi within 
the WTO system provide members with “social identifications,” which are 
“strongly related to feelings of safety and comfort.”218 This social identifica-
tion offers an explanation as to why many countries are still queuing to be-
  
 212. WTO AGREEMENT, supra note 1, pmbl. (“Recognizing further that there is need for positive 
efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, 
secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic devel-
opment . . . .”).  
 213. WTO, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/1, para. 2 (Nov. 14, 
2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mindecl_e/htm (“Recalling the Pre-
amble to the Marrakesh Agreement, we shall continue to make positive efforts designed to ensure that 
developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the growth of 
world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”). 
 214. Id. at para. 3 (“We recognize the particular vulnerability of the least-developed countries and the 
special structural difficulties they face in the global economy. We are committed to addressing the mar-
ginalization of least-developed countries in international trade and to improving their effective participa-
tion in the multilateral trading system.”). 
 215. United Nations Global Compact, About the GC: General Information About the Global Com-
pact, Its Principles, Objectives, and Operations, at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2004) (“Through the power of collective action, the Global Compact seeks to ad-
vance responsible corporate citizenship so that business can be part of the solution to the challenges of 
globalisation. In this way, the private sector—in partnership with other social actors—can help realize 
the Secretary-General’s vision: a more sustainable and inclusive global economy.”). 
 216. Brint, supra note 207, at 3. 
 217. Id. at 4; see EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 303-87 (Karen E. 
Fields trans., 1995) (discussing the purposes of rituals). See generally W. LLOYD WARNER & PAUL S. 
LUNT, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF A MODERN COMMUNITY (1941); RANDALL COLLINS, THEORETICAL 
SOCIOLOGY (1988). 
 218. Brint, supra note 207, at 4. See generally RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, HUNGER OF MEMORY: THE 
EDUCATION OF RICHARD RODRIGUEZ (1981). 
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come a WTO member, thus gaining access to the mainstream of the global 
trading system.219 
The fourth and final variable, “common beliefs in an idea system, a 
moral order, an institution, or a group,” is teleological, and in fact hearkens 
back to the genesis of the prototypical Gesellschaft (GATT 1947).220 Build-
ing a community of peace and prosperity via the commercial bond is the 
seed of this Kantian communitarian telos, first sown in the initial enterprise 
of GATT 1947, after countries again witnessed the tragic consequences of 
economic balkanization precipitated by the failed global Gesellschaft.221 
Interestingly, these common beliefs may also be retranslated into a logical 
outcome of interest-based observation. This nascent community element 
may result from enlightened self-interests that bind the hands of sovereign 
countries to the mast of GATT against the sirens of mutually destructive 
parochialism or protectionism.222 Or, it may be a corollary of the “coordina-
tion game” to overcome the prisoners’ dilemma from the game theory 
standpoint.223 Or, an institutional reconstruction of the global trading system 
via GATT might have simply been compatible with the political interests of 
the Allies, in particular the United States.224 Although theoretically captivat-
ing, these often pessimistic and even scornful “anti-community” perspec-
tives225 tend only to recount—and thus highlight—the very properties of 
Gesellschaft, such as power and interest, which we strive to overcome 
through the construction of the WTO’s Gemeinschaft.  
Based on human interactions, these four variables shape the conceptual 
contour of the WTO’s Gemeinschaft. These communitarian human interac-
tions, which can be paraphrased as “communication”226 or “discourse,”227 
  
 219. See WTO, Current Status of Individual Accessions, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc 
_e/status_e.htm (Updated Mar. 2004). 
 220. Brint, supra note 207, at 3-4. 
 221. SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM AGENDA OF THE 
GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 11-12 (2003) [hereinafter A REFORM AGENDA]. 
 222. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT or GABB? The Future Design of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, 80 YALE L.J. 1299, 1309-36 (1971); Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement 
Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 10 (1999). 
 223. See Kal Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 387, 400-01 (2000); Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of 
International Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 679, 750-52 (2003). 
 224. See Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest 
Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT’L ORG. 485 (1988); JOANNE GOWA, ALLIES, ADVERSARIES AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1994); Joanne Gowa & Edward D. Mansfield, Power Politics and Interna-
tional Trade, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 408 (1993). But cf. Stephen D. Krasner, State Power and the Struc-
ture of International Trade, 28 WORLD POL. 317 (1976) (discussing the idea that an uneven distribution 
of political power will create a more open trading scheme). 
 225. Brint, supra note 207, at 6. Ruth Glass even declared that community studies were “the poor 
sociologist’s substitute for the novel.” Reimer, supra note 33, at 230. See COLLIN BELL & HOWARD 
NEWBY, COMMUNITY STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY 13 
(1971). 
 226. Thomas McCarthy, Translator’s Introduction to 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY vi (Thomas McCarthy 
trans., 1984). McCarthy states that Habermas agrees that communication renders “individual purposive 
actions” coordinated and integrated with social teleology. Id. at ix. 
 227. Thomas McCarthy, Habermas, in A COMPANION TO CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY 397, 402 
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are operated and facilitated by “cooperation.”228 Only through this coopera-
tive communication or discourse among different members, rich and poor, 
will global empathy be established, bringing the development crisis to the 
attention of all. Only through this global empathy can apparent contradic-
tions of values in different corners of the world be mediated and reconciled. 
The rich would not force the poor to conform to unilateral regulations set by 
the former, instead the rich would situate themselves in the position of the 
poor and realize that such regulatory unilateralism may devastate the eco-
nomic development of the poor. Thus, we in the WTO’s Gemeinschaft 
could truly comprehend, immune from parochial prejudice, that unilateral 
protection of the “Flippers” (dolphins) in rich countries may threaten the 
livelihood of small Mexican tuna fishermen in the absence of appropriate 
(re-)distributive justice on a global scale.229 We would then finally move 
from rhetoric to action.  
This global empathy is not generated merely by a pure egalitarian or 
philanthropic impulse. It is, in fact, an outgrowth of human reason or ration-
ality. Although it is often associated with self-interest rather than empathy, 
human reason is not necessarily the type of calculative and strategic behav-
ior reminiscent of Justice Holmes’ “bad man.”230 On the contrary, “commu-
nicative rationality” 231 can extend our empathy by enabling the projection 
of individual life experiences into the public sphere (that is, the WTO’s 
Gemeinschaft) in which human rationality is continuously tested and en-
riched by the connectedness and interdependence of human existence. In 
sum, the ethics of our Gemeinschaftian discourse, as a reconstructed Kant-
ian “practical reason,” mandate us to exercise “perspective-taking” and 
build a moment of empathy.232 
  
(Simon Critchley & William R. Schroeder eds., 1999); see also Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4-11 (1983). To Cover, a community or society is a nomos, a normative universe in 
which law cannot be separated by narratives or discourse concerning the history, literature, and purpose 
of the community or society. Id. 
 228. Habermas’ view is that values such as truth and justice cannot be earned as an outcome, but can 
be reached only in a procedural sense—that is, via a dialogue—in which argumentation or justification is 
rationally accepted by means of “perspective-taking” or “empathy.” McCarthy, supra note 227, at 402. 
This communicative cooperation is regarded as “discourse ethics,” which is nothing but a “reconstruc-
tion of Immanuel Kant’s idea of practical reason.” Id.; see also Ward, supra note 5. 
 229. GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States, Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, unadopted, 
DS21/R-39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/tunadolp 
hinI.pdf.  
 230. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) (“If you want 
to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material 
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reason for 
conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 231. McCarthy, supra note 227, at 404. 
 232. Id. at 402. 
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B. The Law of Nations (Jus Gentium) Revisited 
1. Jus Gentium in the Gemeinschaftian Context 
Admittedly, the WTO’s Gemeinschaft is an ideality, rather than a phe-
nomenon. To bridge the gap between this ideality and reality, and to drive 
the often frustrating what is toward what ought to be, we need a norm or 
law as a steering mechanism.233 In constructing the WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 
law is an indispensable communicative device or language, the use of which 
continuously increases the possibilities of acceptable realities, channeled by 
the equation of global empathy. Therefore, as Ronald Dworkin submits, law 
is “constructive” in that it “show[s] the best route to a better future” and 
thus “unifying” despite divergent interests and projects scattered in the 
community.234 
This very nature of law as a communicative device is especially impera-
tive within the context of the WTO’s Gemeinschaft, which is an imagined 
community where domestic analogies of political deliberation are dramati-
cally limited.235 Therefore, members rely heavily on law as a means of re-
flecting others’ behaviors, designing their own, and thus communicating 
with one another. Furthermore, atomic players such as consumers and pro-
ducers, in addition to states, give and take signals via the translating of the 
law (and thus the communicative function), which predicates the WTO’s 
Gemeinschaft on systematic values such as stability and predictability.236 
Even in a pragmatist sense, this invisible communicative device is superior 
to other decisional mechanisms institutionalized in the WTO, such as the 
General Council, whose material restraints, including unrealistic voting 
rules237 and other physical inconveniences,238 tend to discourage any effi-
cient and meaningful discourse within the community.239 
When we construe law as an essential communicative device largely 
supplementing, or even supplanting, political deliberations, our immediate 
attention tends to be directed toward existing conventions or written legal 
documents. As for basic legislation in the field of development, one might 
  
 233. Cf. Cover, supra note 227, at 9-10 (discussing law as it fits into a normative system). 
 234. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 413 (1986) 
 235. Brint, supra note 207, at 11. 
 236. Cf. WTO, WTO Panel Report on United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
WT/DS152/R, para. 7.76 (Dec. 22, 1999), available at http://www.docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t 
/WT/DS/152R.doc. “The security and predictability in question are of ‘the multilateral trading system.’ 
The multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of States but also, indeed mostly, of 
individual economic operators. The lack of security and predictability affects mostly these individual 
operators.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 237. WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. IX, paras. 1-4 (stipulating “consensus” and “super-majority” 
rules). 
 238. See Supachai Panitchpakdi, Keynote Address: The Evolving Multilateral Trade System in the 
New Millennium, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 419, 439-40 (2001) (describing a dilemma of the “green 
room” process). 
 239. Id. 
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refer to the “Declaration on the Right to Development,”240 which was 
adopted in the UN General Assembly on December 4, 1986. Despite its 
symbolic significance(in the sense that it elevated the development issue to 
the realm of human rights), the Declaration suffers from its abstract and 
vague structure. It leaves open a myriad of legal questions, such as the de-
termination of beneficiaries and duty-holders, as well as its enforceabil-
ity.241 The Doha Work Program shares the same problem. As previously 
discussed, the Work Program itself would have difficulty providing any 
immediate legal force on its own accord.  
Thus, one might reasonably speculate that teeth should be added to 
these legislative instruments to overcome their impotent nature. In this con-
text, some scholars even suggest that technical assistance based on “best 
endeavors” should be converted to binding obligations whose failure would 
be adjudicated in the WTO dispute settlement system.242 Though this sug-
gestion sounds impressive, the practical difficulty of amendment as well as 
the political sensitivity of this issue, particularly from the standpoint of de-
veloped countries, undermines its feasibility. Instead of hastily deriving 
adjudication directly from a foundational document, such as the Doha Dec-
laration (Work Program), the global trading community should consider the 
document as a “framework convention” (as seen in many environmental 
treaties) which spawns a network of subsequent sub-agreements or proto-
cols that are necessary for effective micro-level implementation of the 
framework convention.243 These sub-agreements or protocols should not 
merely declare the goodwill rhetoric that has been frustratingly repeated 
throughout GATT history; they should contain detailed criteria and stan-
dards as to what should be done to provide development assistance and how 
those initiatives should be funded. 
However, these sub-agreements or protocols are not easy to obtain be-
cause most formal legislation in the WTO context must take the form of a 
treaty, which is extremely hard to create under the current WTO mecha-
nism.244 Even if the WTO was equipped with a workable decision-making 
  
 240. G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986). 
 241. See Isabella D. Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for International Economic Law, 
15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1425, 1434-35 (2000). 
 242. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, supra note 91, at 11-12; THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra 
note 76, at 242-43. 
 243. In the field of international environmental law, a “framework convention” provides a basic 
structure of regulation, subsequently followed by more detailed “protocols.” Therefore, regulations as 
well as their negotiations tend to be conducted in an incremental fashion, minimizing unnecessary ten-
sion and conflict. See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, available at http://www.unfcc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf; Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 
U.N.T.S 3; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11, 
097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293.  
 244. See John H. Jackson, Appraising the Launch and Functioning of the WTO, 39 GERMAN Y.B. 
INT’L L. 20, 39 (1996) (“[T]he decision-making and voting procedures of the WTO, although much 
improved over the GATT, still leave much to be desired. It is not clear how the consensus practice will 
proceed, particularly given the large number of countries now or soon involved.”). 
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mechanism, the depth of its regulations would likely be minimal in a tradi-
tional treaty setting for several reasons. First, concluding a treaty is a 
lengthy and painstaking enterprise. Most treaties are negotiated, signed and 
ratified in a slow and tortuous manner. More often, a loss of passion or lack 
of momentum in the middle of the treaty-making process hinders its further 
development. On top of this, due to its strict formality, a treaty is likely to 
be plagued by bureaucratic over-circumspection and red tape throughout the 
whole process. Accordingly, at the very end, the substance that the states 
manage to agree upon may not be beneficial, despite the stylistic and lin-
guistic elegance of the treaty.245 Second, a treaty-making process is basi-
cally political; it calls for a large amount of political capital that can ac-
commodate the cost of both initiation and compromise. Moreover, the 
whole process tends to be swamped by vehement and continuous lobbying 
from interest groups or domestic constituencies, thereby resulting in the 
drawing of a cat instead of a lion. Third, because countries do not want to be 
shamed as “violators,” they tend not to commit themselves to formally bind-
ing pacts.246 Moreover, most countries are eager to retain as much room as 
possible for future flexibility, leading states to minimize the scope of their 
commitments in any formally binding treaty. Very often, treaties’ practical 
effects are also qualified by express reservations. Fourth, treaty texts are 
usually vague and nebulous enough to raise the possibility of self-serving 
interpretations by signatories, and hence an unsatisfying level of compli-
ance. Fifth, most treaties are static and hard to amend. Even if the initial 
scope of regulation was sufficient, the lack of dynamism inherent in treaties 
tends to prevent them from keeping pace with subsequently rising develop-
ment demands. 
In sum, law in the form of mere documents is deficient as an effective 
communicative tool. Although the WTO retains a plethora of agreements 
and provisions, the fact of which is deemed a legal evolution from GATT 
1947 in many ways,247 such corpus juris alone still fails to fulfill the WTO’s 
Gemeinschaftian aspirations under the Gesellschaftian power politics. Even 
with the presence of institutionalized development assistance within the 
WTO, local politics of the rich rampantly ignore basic developmental needs 
of the poor.248 Therefore, this failure is better characterized as a general lack 
of normative consciousness than a mere violation or inadequacy of the 
rules. Only through Gemeinschaftian discourses and consequent global em-
pathy can this failure be reversed. Current WTO rules as lex lata derive 
  
 245. See John H. Jackson, International Economic Law in Times That Are Interesting, 3 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 3, 8 (2000) (stating that “[t]reaties are often an awkward albeit necessary method of designing 
institutions needed in today’s interdependent world, but they do not solve many problems”). 
 246. See Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal, 45 INT’L ORG. 495, 537-
38 (1991) (summarizing the benefits of informal agreements vis-à-vis formal agreements (treaties), 
including a non-binding nature). 
 247. See generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading System 
through the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 161 (1995). 
 248. See supra Part III.A. 
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from a series of compromised negotiational outcomes. Accordingly, these 
rules inevitably radiate the political preferences of the rich and powerful 
members; they are often contrary to the fundamental norm of free trade or 
anti-protection. Consequently, after a half-century of institutional evolution, 
the WTO still underperforms its foremost agendum. Therefore, the WTO’s 
Gemeinschaft must function to allow the free trade mechanism to bear its 
original distributive justice without undue political interference and manipu-
lation. The current WTO should rise above those positivistic—and thus ex-
cusable—lex, and construct an ultimate normative referential precept, jus, 
which not only guides and regulates members’ behaviors but also consti-
tutes the Gemeinschaft. It is this very reason why we should pursue the 
“Law of Nations” (“jus gentium”) not only as a source of law premised on 
the Thomist “distinguo,”249 but also as central hermeneutics which should 
reveal, through interpretations, the Gemeinschaftian telos of the WTO. 
In fact, the history of jus gentium eloquently relates its supreme com-
munitarian aspiration, a virtuous cycle of common peace and prosperity. 
Starting from a municipal system in the Roman Empire, jus gentium earned 
its international appeal after the Thirty Years War devastated several centu-
ries’ brilliant civilizational achievements in Europe.250 After witnessing the 
misery of the war, pioneering philosophers and legal scholars strived to 
achieve a mutually supportive and peaceful human community. These inno-
vators attempted to tame and regulate brutal and irrational human behav-
iors—often committed in the name of sovereignty—through jus gentium.  
Remarkably, Leibniz formulates universal justice as the discovery of 
one’s own benefit in benefiting others, and thus mankind.251 He sermonizes 
through his life the precept that a person’s true felicity comes only from 
“locating their identity in benefitting mankind and their posterity.”252 
Throughout his works, including the Elementra Juris Naturali and the Co-
dex Juris Gentium, Leibniz emphasizes that empathy and compassion to-
ward others is “never absurdity nor negligence” and that “[u]njust is my 
good that causes harm to others.”253 Therefore, his version of natural law 
(jus naturale) is that “[t]he most perfect society is that whose purpose is the 
universal and supreme happiness.”254 Leibniz believes that the idea of natu-
ral law as a robust manifestation of egalitarian ethics can be reincarnated in 
the real world, in accordance with the contingence of time and place.255 Vat-
  
 249. ROSCOE POUND, A WORLD LEGAL ORDER: LAW AND LAWS IN RELATION TO WORLD LAW 4 
(1959). 
 250. See INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, at xxix-xxx (Lori F. Damrosch et al. eds., 
4th ed. 2001). 
 251. Robert Trout, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness: How the Natural Law Concept of 
G.W. Leibniz Inspired America’s Founding Fathers (pt. 2), FIDELIO, Spring 1997, available at http://ww 
w.schillerinstitute.org/fid_97-01/971_vattel-2.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).  
 252. Id. 
 253. HIDEAKI HIRANO, LEIBNIZ’S CULTURAL PLURALISM AND NATURAL LAW 42 (1997), http://prof. 
mt.tama.hosei.ac.jp/~hhirano/academia/leibniz.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).  
 254. Trout, supra note 251, available at http://www.schillerinstitute.org/fid_97-01/971_vattel-2.html.  
 255. HIRANO, supra note 253, at 14.  
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tel, based on the Leibnizian natural law perspective, concretized the concept 
of jus gentium. He stresses that each man’s selfish pursuit of interest with-
out consideration of the welfare of others inevitably falls into the crack of 
wretchedness, and argues that we should first endeavor to promote the gen-
eral happiness of mankind, which will be rewarded by the same deed from 
others.256 Therefore, Vattel defines the first general law of nations as the 
following: “[E]ach individual nation is bound to contribute every thing in 
her power to the happiness and perfection of all the others.”257  
This “duty to assist” as the foremost form of the Law of Nations has 
also been adopted and advocated by modern philosophers such as John 
Rawls. Rawls acknowledges that certain societies may be burdened in that 
they lack material resources needed to be well-ordered, and that well-
ordered and thus affluent peoples have a duty to assist these “burdened so-
cieties.”258 He elevates this duty to one of the “Principles of the Law of 
Peoples.”259 Certainly, this communitarian duty bases its legitimacy on the 
high probability that no member participating in the WTO discourse and 
communication would disapprove of it.260 It is in fact a definitional feature 
of the Gemeinschaft, clad with a norm. 
2. The Gemeinschaftian Mission of Jus Gentium: Regulating Politics 
The WTO’s development failure, which is a defining feature of anti-
Gemeinschaft, is attributable largely to the mechanics of domestic politics. 
Ironically, the protectionist barriers imposed by the rich on basic products, 
such as the agricultural products and textiles, hurt the poor and also damage 
their own domestic constituencies. Consumers have a preference for cheap 
products, producers want cheap (foreign) raw materials to manufacture up-
per-level products, and retailers depend on low input prices in order to es-
tablish sustainable profit margins. However, the damage suffered by domes-
tic economic players in the rich nations is rather indirect and diffuse. It pro-
vides them with little incentive to organize and defend their interests by 
contesting those trade barriers.261 Therefore, these consumers, producers, 
and retailers tend to be underrepresented in terms of trade policy develop-
ment.  
  
 256. Vattel’s Natural Law, supra note 204 (citing VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, PRELIMINARIES, 
sec. 10 (1758)). 
 257. Id. (citing VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, PRELIMINARIES, sec. 13 (1758)). 
 258. RAWLS, supra note 202, at 106. 
 259. Id. at 37. 
 260. McCarthy, supra note 227, at 402; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 66 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990). 
 261. See Judith Goldstein, International Institutions and Domestic Politics: GATT, WTO, and the 
Liberalization of International Trade, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 94, at 140; C. 
FRED BERGSTEN, THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN 2000, (Int’l Inst. 
of Econ., Working Paper No. 99-6, 1999), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/1999/99-
6.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). 
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In contrast, domestic producers whose products compete with cheap 
foreign imports in the domestic market tend to have a more direct interest in 
maintaining the trade barriers than other domestic actors. This is mainly due 
to the fear of losing the “competition” to the foreign producers. Conse-
quently, they tend to engage in well-organized lobbying activities.262 Those 
producers tend to be overrepresented in terms of trade policies. This dis-
crepancy in representation translates into political failure, or worse, “consti-
tutional failure”263 from a Madisonian perspective.264 Moreover, its impact 
is not confined to the domestic sphere. The distortion in domestic interest 
representation will eventually hurt those developing countries that produce 
basic input products, which in turn will undermine their economic base.  
The elimination of domestic protection has proven to be a political chal-
lenge in developed countries. However, it would be even more difficult for 
those developed countries to share their national resources with other devel-
oping countries to the extent necessary for the latter to improve their eco-
nomic situation. Politicians basically represent and are held accountable to 
their domestic constituencies—groups not known to be advocates of inter-
national economic justice at the expense of their own wealth. Even if some 
politicians realize a serious need for development assistance from an eco-
nomic, humanitarian, or other perspective, they would not risk their political 
lives to urge their constituencies to contribute their precious money to the 
development of a far-away poor country.265 
It is often and accurately stated that all politics is local.266 While devel-
opment assistance requires a long-term commitment to realize a tangible 
outcome in an area such as capacity-building, most politicians have a short-
sighted perspective on account of the length of the typical election cycle. 
Advocating a long-term project where the real outcome may materialize 
after they are out of office would not be a wise political strategy.267 This 
  
 262. See, e.g., Bush the Anti-Globalizer, ECONOMIST, May 11, 2002, at 14, 16 (criticizing the United 
States’ new farm bill, which would severely undermine free trade principles to protect the domestic 
agricultural sector, but eventually benefit only the “biggest and richest 10%” of farmers); Cleansing the 
Augean Stables, ECONOMIST, July 13, 2002, at 12 (criticizing the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) for spending half of the EU budget to feed a small population of farmers who are “less than 5% of 
the workforce”). Cf. UN WIRE (Stern), supra note 143 (reporting that World Bank Chief Economist 
Nicholas Stern accused rich countries of hypocrisy for urging free trade in the developing world “while 
imposing protectionist measures that cater to powerful special interests”). 
 263. ROBERT E. HUDEC, ESSAYS ON THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 133 (1999) (quot-
ing Jan Tumlir that “[p]rotectionism is a constitutional failure”). See generally JAN TUMLIR, 
PROTECTIONISM: TRADE POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES (1985). 
 264. See Peter M. Gerhart, The Two Constitutional Visions of the World Trade Organization, 24 U. 
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 19-20 (2003) (highlighting the WTO’s “internal, economic” vision as a “healthy 
antidote” to parochial interests). 
 265. See Jack Goldsmith, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND COSMOPOLITAN DUTY, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667, 
1675-82 (2003). 
 266. Cf. Shaffer, supra note 187, at 609, at http://www.UNWire/20020930/29272_story.asp (observ-
ing that protection costs imposed on domestic constituencies are less transparent than the costs of other 
positive programs, and accordingly politicians tend to “respond more favorably” to protectionism against 
“unrepresented foreigners”). See generally TIP O’NEILL, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL: AND OTHER RULES OF 
THE GAME (1994). 
 267. Of course, under the peculiar situation of the Cold War, political motivations for development 
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inherent myopia of domestic politics lies at the heart of the failed Gesell-
schaft of GATT and the WTO. Power-oriented politics continue to distort 
and manipulate free trade and basic market mechanisms. Sadly, if used cor-
rectly, these tools could transform the economic standing of the poor by 
allowing them to acquire foreign currencies and reinvest them for further 
development.  
In the face of such political failure, jus gentium of international trade 
signifies a perspectival shift from negotiational politics to a norm which 
checks politics, promotes free trade, and achieves effective development 
assistance. In this regard, a functional, operational mission of jus gentium 
lies in “legalization,”268 which can be broadly defined as a tendency to in-
crease reliance on norms and normative pull in the context of trade relations 
between the rich and the poor. Legalization is a practical manifestation of 
jus gentium that realizes the WTO’s Gemeinschaft by imbuing stability and 
  
aid could remain. However, in a post-Cold War era, the volume of foreign aid by rich countries has 
substantially shrunk. See WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS, supra note 54, at 299.  
 268. No unified definition of “legalization” exists. Many scholars of international law as well as 
international relations have long used the term legalization or its siblings—such as “judicialization” or 
“juridicization”—within different contexts and with different meanings. Arie Reich provided for a quite 
general concept of juridicization, which was defined as a tendency of regulating trade relations by “using 
norms and enforcement procedures that are LEGAL in character,” thereby “creat[ing] significant limita-
tions on the sovereignty of the States.” Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of Inter-
national Trade Relations, 17 NW. J. INT’L & BUS. 775, 776 (1996-97). However, Reich conceptually 
distinguished between juridicization and legalization, which was defined as “making lawful a phenome-
non which prior thereto was against the law.” Id. at 777 n.3. Other scholars explored legalization from a 
judicial standpoint, highlighting a dispute settlement mechanism involving international courts or tribu-
nals. See Robert E. Hudec, The Judicialization of GATT Dispute Settlement, in IN WHOSE INTEREST?: 
DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 9-43 (Michael M. Hart & Debra P. 
Steger eds., 1992); Alec Stone Sweet, The New GATT: Dispute Resolution and the Judicialization of the 
Trade Regime in LAW ABOVE NATIONS: SUPRANATIONAL COURTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS 
138 (Mary L. Volcansek ed., 1997) (observing that “WTO legal norms gradually embed themselves 
within national legal systems, either by domestic legislative actions or judicial decisions.”). More re-
cently, Kenneth Abbott and other legal scholars and political scientists have attempted to define legaliza-
tion in a clearer and more analytical fashion. Based on the proposition that legalization refers to a “par-
ticular set of characteristics that institutions may (or may not) possess,” they define legalization along 
three dimensions: “obligation,” which means that states or other actors are bound by rules or commit-
ments; “precision,” which means that those rules or commitments are determinate; and “delegation,” 
which means that third parties are authorized to interpret and apply those rules as well as resolve dis-
putes. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, in LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 
17 (Judith L. Goldstein et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter LEGALIZATION]. A wide spectrum exists in each of 
these dimensions, ranging from “hard” to “soft” legalization. Id. at 17-18. This multi-dimensional defini-
tion of legalization, despite its analytical sharpness and clarity, cannot be free from controversy mainly 
due to its inherent political overtone. In other words, it basically assumes that legalization as institution-
alization is a matter of choice by states, insinuating that states can freely withdraw their initial choice of 
legalization. Id. at 7. Finally, legalization should be distinguished from “constitutionalization,” which 
deals more deeply with “foundational problems of social order.” Id. at 5. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 
How to Constitutionalize International Law and Foreign Policy for the Benefit of Civil Society?, 20 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 30 (1998). But see Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy and Global 
Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too Far in EFFICIENCY EQUITY & 
LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 227-30 (Roger B. Porter et 
al. eds., 2001). However, this constitutionalization should also be differentiated from the “constitutional 
understanding” of international trade law posited by John Jackson. See WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra 
note 11, at 339; John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 17, 25-28 (1996); John H. Jackson, Perspectives on Regionalism in Trade Relations, 27 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 873, 873 (1996) [hereinafter Perspectives on Regionalism]. 
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predictability in development-related issues and tames political whims and 
uncertainty by making them more costly than ever.269 Therefore, legaliza-
tion eventually communicates with the concept of a “trade constitution,” in 
the sense that it denotes “an intricate set of constraints imposed by a variety 
of rules or legal norms” in a particular institutional setting.270  
3. The Dual Nature of Implementing Jus Gentium 
The aforementioned “duty to assist” as the fundamental Law of Nations 
of the WTO’s Gemeinschaft can be implemented under the WTO’s every-
day operation in two different forms—negative and positive. 
The first form of jus gentium of international trade is the most funda-
mental tenet of international trade, which is nothing but a negative obliga-
tion of anti-protection. Free trade without protection is a superior develop-
mental apparatus to any special trade preferences or aid—aid without free 
trade never surpasses free trade without aid. Yet, the realities of the political 
economy of the rich, in addition to the legal vacuum or lacunae that is inevi-
table under positivistic conventions, often compromise this supreme norm. 
Therefore, the first mode of implementing jus gentium in the WTO’s Ge-
meinschaft is to save the fallen mission of the global Gesellschaft—free 
trade—and thus pave a firm ground for international economic justice by 
enabling, and eventually helping, the poor to make the most of their com-
parative advantage.  
Importantly, trade jurisprudence can contribute to realizing this negative 
mode of jus gentium of international trade by declaring and expounding the 
unwritten law of development. Facing various cases that intersect trade and 
development, dispute settlement organs, such as the WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body, can authoritatively strike down various forms of protec-
tionist and other WTO-illegal measures adopted and applied by developed 
countries, which hurt developing countries.271 The advanced and highly 
calibrated dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO tends to nurture 
such case law and enhance the arbiters’ authority vis-à-vis the old GATT.272 
Development case law reverberates in future cases, influencing and deter-
mining state behavior in this field. In fact, in contrast with various past leg-
  
 269. See Goldstein, supra note 261, at 149, 151; see also ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: 
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 97 (1984). 
 270. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 339 (2d ed. 1997); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 101-04 (1998); John H. Jackson, Reflec-
tions on International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 25-28 (1996); Perspectives on 
Regionalism, supra note 268, at 873; see also Antonio F. Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Com-
ity in National Security, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 316-24 (1998) (discussing Professor Jackson’s consti-
tutional premise of international trade law). 
 271. Cf. Julio Lacarte-Muró & Petina Gappah, Developing Countries and the WTO Legal and Dis-
pute Settlement System: A View from the Bench, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 395, 395-401 (2000) (noting the 
active participation in the WTO dispute settlement system by the developing countries with the increas-
ing awareness of the benefits derived from participation). 
 272. Cf. Goldstein, supra note 261, at 149 (stating that the new dispute settlement mechanism does 
not allow countries to be punished if they fail to live up to their WTO obligations). 
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islative initiatives that started with fanfare but ended with a fizz, interna-
tional trade tribunals have recently responded to developmental concerns in 
a quiet, yet effective manner. They often speak softly but carry a big stick. 
Even without relying on an eventual enforcement mechanism (sanctions), 
normative radiation emitted against the background of rich jurisprudence 
can successfully check the problematic behaviors of the developed coun-
tries. In this regard, Robert Hudec observes that “[t]he key point . . . is that a 
legal ruling without retaliation can still be an effective policy tool for a de-
veloping country seeking to reverse a legal violation by a larger country.”273 
This negative mode of jurisprudence tends to police developed coun-
tries’ protectionism and push for further trade liberalization so that develop-
ing countries can secure better access to developed markets for manufac-
tured as well as agricultural products. For instance, in 1999 the WTO Ap-
pellate Body (AB) blocked Turkey’s attempt to launch a new quantitative 
restriction on textiles imported from India in Turkish Quantitative Restric-
tions (QRs).274 In this case, Turkey, a developing country, actually intro-
duced a new quota.275 However, the EU left Turkey, who had already signed 
an association agreement with the EU, no option but to replicate the pre-
existing quota that formed part of the EU’s common external trade poli-
cies.276 Turkey justified the new quota by invoking the GATT Article XXIV 
exception, arguing that its association agreement with the EU exempted the 
quota under Article XXIV.277 If accepted, the new quota would have 
harmed India’s economic development, since textiles represent one of its 
main exports. However, the AB interpreted Article XXIV not as an excep-
tion, but as an important parameter of trade liberalization. According to the 
AB, regional trade agreements are meaningful only to the extent that they 
promote further liberalization and do not establish new restrictions against 
non-member countries like India.278 This decision yields a critical implica-
tion in terms of development, in which case law will prevent developed 
countries from expanding their pre-existing trade barriers against develop-
ing countries in the name of regional trade agreements. 
As another example of negative jurisprudence regulating rich countries’ 
protectionist trade policies, the recent U.S.—Combed Cotton Yarn279 deci-
sion merits special attention. Policies affecting textiles are commonly 
known as some of the “hardest-fought” issues under the old GATT and the 
  
 273. Robert E. Hudec, The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: A Developing Country 
Perspective, in HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 83 (emphasis added). 
 274. WTO Appellate Body, Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, 
WT/DS34/AB/R, paras. 64-66 (Nov. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Turkish QRs], available at http://www.wto.o 
rg/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm. 
 275. Id. at para. 2. 
 276. Id. at para 3.  
 277. Id. at para. 17. 
 278. Id. at para. 57. 
 279. WTO Appellate Body, United States—Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn 
from Pakistan, WT/DS192/AB/R (Oct. 8, 2001) [hereinafter U.S.—Combed Cotton Yarn], available at 
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new WTO system.280 Spurred by domestic lobbies, developed countries 
have desperately protected this industry—despite the absence of compara-
tive advantage—primarily through bilateral import quotas and VERs under 
the Multifiber Arrangement.281 Such a blatant antithesis of free trade has 
consistently plagued developing countries, such as Pakistan, whose chief 
comparative advantage lies in this sector—their gains from trade have been 
forfeited due to this protectionism. Naturally, finding a remedy to this dis-
torted situation was one of the most grave missions of the Uruguay Round. 
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)282 was created for the pur-
pose of phasing out those trade restrictions under the MFA by fully integrat-
ing the textiles and clothing sector into the WTO discipline.283 However, 
developed countries, such as the United States and the EU, have failed to 
take any positive steps in implementing the ATC even as the 2005 deadline 
draws near.284 Critically, the vague text of the ATC, which pursues the pro-
gressive integration of textiles and clothing to the WTO system, rather than 
specifying a concrete timetable for phase-out of quotas, provides developed 
countries with an excuse for delay or lack of effort in implementing the 
agreement.285 To make things worse for developing countries, the ATC also 
provides for a “transitional safeguard mechanism” under which developed 
countries can still protect their domestic textiles and clothing industries un-
der certain circumstances.286 
Against this gloomy background, the case was brought before the WTO. 
Pakistan complained that the United States unduly restricted imports of 
Pakistani yarn through the transitional safeguard mechanism under the 
ATC, while the United States attempted to justify its action by arguing that 
the increased Pakistani yarn imports caused “serious damage, and actual 
threat thereof,” to its domestic industry.287 In addition to the tedious phas-
ing-out of textiles quotas under the ATC, the existence of this special safe-
guard clause is extremely vexing to textile-exporting countries like Paki-
stan. It would be a serious blow to developing countries if the clause func-
tioned as a new trade barrier through overly generous interpretations by the 
panel or the AB. However, the AB imposed firm discipline in invoking the 
clause. Upholding the panel’s findings, the AB declared the U.S. transi-
tional safeguard mechanism illegal under the ATC, pointing out that the 
United States improperly narrowed the scope of the affected domestic in-
dustry and that it also exaggerated damages from Pakistani yarn imports by 
  
 280. WTO, Trade Topics: Textiles, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/texti_e/texti_e.htm (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2004). 
 281. See THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 82, at 375-77. 
 282. See supra note 190. 
 283. WTO, supra note 280. 
 284. See Alice J.H. Wohn, Towards GATT Integration: Circumventing Quantitative Restrictions on 
Textiles and Apparel Trade Under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 375, 375-
76 (2001); Dunoff, supra note 187, at 981. 
 285. GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 61. 
 286. ATC, supra note 190, art. 6. 
 287. U.S.—Combed Cotton Yarn, supra note 280, paras. 1-2. 
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not examining the effects of imports from Mexico.288 Undoubtedly, this 
strict interpretation of the traditional safeguard mechanism suits the objec-
tive of the ATC—“further liberalization of trade”289—thereby eventually 
responding to the concerns of developing countries that export textiles and 
clothing. 
Nonetheless, this type of negative enforcement of the Law of Nations, 
or the duty to assist, may not suffice to fulfill the purpose of the WTO’s 
Gemeinschaft. Indeed, rich countries may pursue policies that are based on 
legitimate, non-trade grounds, which inadvertently have a protectionist ef-
fect and are not within the scope of the WTO’s preventative power. A 
common example arises out of divergent social or environmental standards 
resulting from different levels of development. Although general economic 
growth fueled by free trade in poor countries tends to result in increasing 
levels of social hygiene under the regulatory Kuznets effect,290 this phe-
nomenon, even if it should transpire, would occur only in the long-term. 
However, in the short to medium term, the effect is different under typical 
circumstances. Rich countries adopting and enforcing social policies based 
on purely legitimate, non-protectionist objectives, such as the protection of 
human health or the environment, will find that their poor trading partners 
are unable to comply with high, sophisticated regulatory standards. These 
countries lack the technical and financial capacity necessary to adopt and 
implement such standards. This regulatory non-compliance, albeit innocent 
and inescapable from the standpoint of the poor countries, results in the 
denial of access to the rich countries’ markets. Clearly, without workable 
technical and financial assistance from the rich to the poor, the WTO’s Ge-
meinschaft would suffer from a serious “development deficit.”291 
As this dilemma of divergent standards and capacities demonstrates, the 
Law of Nations in international trade should also be manifested through a 
positive mode. This requires the rich to play a more active role (beyond 
mere anti-protection) in sharing regulatory burdens with the poor without 
undue interference with the latter’s market access—a critical developmental 
mechanism. A positive role connotes a redistribution of resources, both 
technical and financial, between rich and poor countries.292 In 1996, United 
States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 293 the 
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 289. ATC, supra note 190, pmbl. 
 290. See Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1955); 
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 291. Amorim, supra note 21, at 96-99. 
 292. See Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformations: The WTO as a Distributive Organization, 17 AM. 
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very first case adjudicated under the new WTO dispute settlement system, 
provided an archetype for development-related litigation of this kind. Brazil 
and Venezuela complained that the United States discriminated against for-
eign refiners in enforcing its domestic environmental standards. The AB 
rejected a U.S. defense based on domestic administrative difficulties, hold-
ing that the U.S. administration failed to take into account foreign (develop-
ing countries in casu) interests and to establish a certain cooperative ar-
rangement with affected countries (Brazil and Venezuela).294 Undoubtedly, 
in a setting involving developed and developing countries, a cooperative 
arrangement tends to contain both technical and financial assistance. Oth-
erwise, developed countries could not achieve their domestic regulatory 
goals on account of the limited regulatory capacity of the developing coun-
tries that are affected by those regulations. 
Similarly, in 1998, the WTO Appellate Body once again struck down a 
U.S. application of its turtle protection legislation in United States—Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products.295 The AB found that 
the United States failed to make “available and feasible” efforts to negotiate 
a cooperative agreement with foreign (developing) countries (India, Paki-
stan, and Malaysia) affected by the measure, despite the existence of various 
multilateral fora for such an agreement.296 Inspiringly, this jurisprudence 
has resonated even outside of the WTO, particularly within the context of 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) dispute settlement pro-
ceedings. A recent case, In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services,297 
arose from the U.S. refusal to allow cross-border transportation of Mexican 
trucks for public safety reasons after the United States failed to phase out 
the initial moratorium, which was required pursuant to Annex I of the 
NAFTA. Faced with a politically sensitive case, the NAFTA panel unani-
mously ruled that the United States violated NAFTA Articles 1202 (national 
treatment for cross-border services) and 1203 (most-favored-nation treat-
ment for cross-border services), since the U.S. government failed to con-
sider “more acceptable, less trade restrictive, alternatives” to a blanket 
moratorium.298 The panel also determined that the “inadequacies of the 
Mexican regulatory system” could not form the basis for a U.S. morato-
rium.299 It thereby implied that the U.S., as a developed country, should 
have expended more effort to address Mexico’s regulatory inadequacies. 
The NAFTA panel cited and relied on the WTO decisions in Gasoline and 
Shrimp-Turtle.300 
  
 294. Id. at paras. 26-27. 
 295. WTO Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prod-
ucts, WT/DS58 (Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop 
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 296. Id. at paras. 166-70. 
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Finally, one should note how the Appellate Body has reached this de-
velopment-related jurisprudence. Obviously, there is no direct textual basis 
for this jurisprudence in the relatively few (only 38) provisions of GATT, 
which have become obsolete since they have not been updated at all in 
GATT’s half-century history. However, the AB managed to develop an 
innovative method of interpretation on the basis of the depressingly fixed 
text of GATT. The AB focused on the previously unused preambulary lan-
guage in Article XX, know as the “chapeau.” The AB interpreted the cha-
peau’s phrases of “arbitrary” or “unjustifiable” discrimination in scrutiniz-
ing whether the United States took reasonable measures to take into account 
foreign interests. Although the chapeau provides a technical, textual basis 
for this new approach, the AB transcended the lexicographical meaning in 
articulating an integrative telos for the WTO’s Gemeinschaft.301 In a highly 
interdependent world, aggressive regulatory unilateralism by a developed 
country—often accompanied by trade sanctions—undoubtedly hurts many 
developing countries.302 The only way to attain both regulatory and devel-
opmental goals is for developed countries to assist developing countries 
attempting to comply with the former’s high regulatory standards by offer-
ing proper financial and technical assistance. This is the ideal status in 
which a dual goal of free markets and regulatory autonomy can be achieved 
in a non-conflicting and harmonious fashion, realizing the aforementioned 
telos of communitarian integration.  
4. Beyond Formalism: Manifesting Jus Gentium as Soft Law 
Once the jus gentium of international trade has fully permeated the 
WTO’s Gemeinschaft, the format which caused it to materialize will be 
marginalized. When jus gentium becomes more atmospheric, it effectively 
conducts communication and discourse by transcending narrow legal for-
mality. Then, a development-related legal reference need not clothe itself in 
a hard layer of textual justification. The legal format will be less relevant 
once it delivers certain legal meaning and legal force, through which it may 
influence and alter the trade and development behavior of its members. This 
legal reference is often labeled a “guideline” or “recommendation” and col-
lectively termed “soft law.”303 Admittedly, it is not a formal treaty and thus 
is technically non-binding. 
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taining that “a sane theory would utterly disregard a Documentary text if any relevant practices existed 
to offer a firmer, more living basis for the ideal picture.”). 
 302. See Cullet, supra note 114, at 558-59 (emphasizing “solidarity,” reflecting the interdependence 
and integration of the global trading system). 
 303. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, in 
LEGALIZATION, supra note 268, at 37-72; Eibe Riedel, Standards and Sources: Farewell to the Exclusiv-
ity of the Sources Triad in International Law?, 2 EUR. J. INT’L L. 58, 79 (1991) (discussing “new eco-
nomic standards” with the proliferation of international economic transactions). For example, one of the 
most representative sectors in the APEC in which such guidelines and standards proliferate is the “stan-
dards and conformance” sector. The Sub-Committee on Standards and Conformance (SCSC) was estab-
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However, regardless of its format, such guidelines or recommendations 
are typically well observed, chiefly because their creators are mostly work-
ing-level regulators (specialists) who regularly participate in sector-specific 
committees,304 rather than high-ranking bureaucrats or political appointees 
(generalists). In other words, the normative value of soft law can be guaran-
teed by an epistemic understanding among its creators who engage in the 
“jurisgenerative”305 process. Moreover, guidelines or recommendations are 
usually clear and unambiguous enough to directly respond to certain situa-
tions that involve development concerns. This concreteness contributes to 
strong compliance with such micro-legislation or soft law, which can be 
referenced, cited, and invoked in real disputes through the vehicle of legal 
arguments. 
Remarkably, this soft law often provides a constructive solution to po-
tential disputes involving developed and developing countries. As discussed 
above,306 the evolution of jurisprudence through the WTO dispute settle-
ment mechanism is capable of addressing development-related disputes. 
However, an adjudicative framework unavoidably involves an adversarial 
and confrontational dynamic between developed and developing countries. 
This dynamic may be undesirable when both parties have high stakes—
where losing the case is politically intolerable to either party. These disputes 
are more likely to be intensified and escalated than to be resolved. Under 
these circumstances, both developed and developing countries would be 
better off if they could resolve their disputes through a rule-making process 
rather than an adjudicative procedure possibly involving retaliation as an 
enforcement measure. Because it is more transparent and constructive, the 
resolution of development-related disputes through the establishment of 
new guidelines is far superior to normal settlements which tend to be private 
and bilateral. Additionally, a guideline established in this manner can radi-
ate a legal force to third parties in future cases.  
A recent WTO case involving Canada and Brazil illuminates and sup-
ports the aforesaid position. On February 3, 2001, Canada banned the im-
portation of Brazilian beef for the fear of mad cow disease (BSE).307 Al-
  
lished under the Committee for Trade and Investment (CTI). One reason for establishing the SCSC was 
to encourage the alignment of members’ standards with international standards and to achieve mutual 
recognition among APEC economies of conformity assessment in regulated and voluntary sectors. The 
SCSC completed the “Guidelines for the preparation, adoption and review of technical regulations” and 
the “APEC Food MRA (Mutual Recognition Arrangement): Supplementary Material” in 1997. See 
APEC Committee, Standard and Conformances, at http://203.127.220.66/loadall.htm?http://203.127.220 
.66/committee/standards.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004). 
 304. See OCED Working Party of the Trade Committee, Regulatory Reform and International Stan-
dardization, TD/TC/WP(98)36/FINAL, at 28-32 (Jan. 28, 1999) (discussing “regulators as players in 
standardisation”), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/19/1955309.pdf. 
 305. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE 
ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 110 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992).  
 306. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 307. Canadian Ban on Brazilian Beef Imports Escalates Trade Battle, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS 
DIG. (Int’l Centre for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switzeland), Feb. 13, 2001, [hereinafter Trade 
Battle], available at http://www.newsbulletin.org/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin_ID=14&issue/ID=1937&bro 
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though Canada based the ban on a previous measure announced to the 
WTO, the measure was originally not meant to apply to Brazil.308 This un-
expected, sudden ban by Canada enraged the Brazilian community, prompt-
ing the Brazilian government to threaten to challenge Canada in various 
international dispute settlement fora, including the International Court of 
Justice and the WTO, and to support public protests and boycotts of Cana-
dian products.309 This high-profile dispute could have easily developed into 
a full-blown WTO case.310 
However, rather than resorting to litigation, the parties elected to ad-
dress this dispute in the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS Committee). During the SPS Committee consultations, Brazil pro-
posed a mandate for EU members to notify the WTO of the introduction of 
SPS measures which arise from previously announced SPS policies if those 
new SPS measures “may have negative effects on trade opportunities of 
developing countries.”311 This proposal was eventually adopted in the SPS 
Committee in the form of a revised “Recommended Procedures for Imple-
menting the Transparency Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7).”312 
Both Brazil and Canada agreed that the dispute had been resolved with the 
adoption of the revised recommendation.313 All told, through a rich dis-
course steered by the clear legal consciousness of a “development-sensitive” 
obligation, a developed country (Canada) and a developing country (Brazil) 
succeeded in breathing new life into the existing legal document, and con-
sequently materializing a communitarian symbiosis through the settlement 




 308. SPS Committee Resolves Implementation Issue, Discusses Biotech, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE 
NEWS DIG. (Int’l Centre for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switzerland), Mar. 26, 2001, [hereinaf-
ter SPS Committee], available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-03-26/story4.htm. 
 309. See Trade Battle, supra note 307. 
 310. See, e.g., WTO Panel, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26 (Feb. 13, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm. 
 311. WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Implementation Proposal under 
Paragraph 21: Proposal by Brazil, G/SPS/W/108 (June 22, 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto. 
org. 
Where the introduction of SPS measures may have negative effects on trade opportunities of 
developing countries, Members shall provide information in accordance with the provisions 
of Annex B and the additional requirements for justification alluded to in Article 10.2, includ-
ing where the concerned measures constitute an administrative measure, such as a ban or a 
temporary suspension of importation, arising from an SPS policy previously notified to the 
WTO. 
Id. 
 312. WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Recommended Procedures for Im-
plementing the Transparency Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7): Revision, G/SPS/7/Rev.2 
(Apr. 2, 2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org. 
 313. See SPS Committee, supra note 308. 
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C. The Gemeinschaftian Education of Jus Gentium 
Law,314 not politics, is the medium of discourse in the WTO’s Gemein-
schaft. Participants of the discourse—whether governments, consumers, or 
producers—comprehend, evaluate, and predict each other’s trade behaviors 
through the law. They also design their own behaviors based on the law. 
Therefore, understanding such law (the jus gentium of international trade) is 
critical to participation in the Gemeinschaftian discourse within the WTO 
system. Without this understanding of the law, the discourse itself is incon-
ceivable. With an inaccurate understanding of the law, the efficiency of the 
discourse decreases dramatically. On the contrary, if those participants are 
well-versed in the law, the discourse tends to be productive and construc-
tive. It then effectively mediates between what we are and what we ought to 
be, and thus achieves the Gemeinschaftian goal—global empathy.  
In reality, however, WTO laws, including its statutes and case law, are 
too complicated to be understood by ordinary people. WTO jurisprudence is 
full of esoteric semantics and codes, which very few would actually venture 
to read, let alone comprehend. Typically, only trained legal scholars grapple 
with these subjects. Under such circumstances, the discourse in the WTO 
tends to be highly exclusive, concentrated in the hands of these elites, or the 
titular “groupe sémiotique.”315 Ordinary people remain excluded from the 
communicative process because they do not, and cannot, understand WTO 
laws if they lack the necessary background knowledge or analytical skills. 
This alienating, disintegrative aspect of WTO law can only be overcome by 
“educating” ordinary people to comprehend a fundamental, and thus more 
understandable, legal precept—the jus gentium of international trade—
rather than those puzzling codes. After all, law, not laws, should be the su-
preme communicative vehicle for all participants, be they states or individu-
als. Only then will all participants become proficient in the law, thus im-
proving communication.  
In sum, public education on the WTO’s Gemeinschaft, for the sake of 
increased public proficiency, should inform the public of the jus gentium of 
international trade without seeking mastery of the complicated details of 
WTO jurisprudence. For this purpose, an easily comprehensible set of core 
precepts about international trade law, tantamount to the “Restatement of 
International Trade Law,” should be developed.316 In a sense, this heuristic 
document would function as a device to convert esoteric WTO codes to 
  
 314. The term “law” connotes specific treaties, agreements, and other legal documents which are 
“reified” forms of law such as the jus gentium of international trade. Yet, these laws cannot contradict 
law because the former are reified—directly derived—from the latter. Thomas Aquinas formulated this 
structure of understanding law and laws in his notion of “distinguo.” See POUND, supra note 249, at 4. 
 315. Cf. BERNARD S. JACKSON, SEMIOTICS AND LEGAL THEORY 286 (1985) (observing that the 
“audience,” or “groupe sémiotique” of judicial discourse is relatively restricted); PETER GOODRICH, 
LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 7 (1987) (arguing that 
“legal practice and legal language are structured in such a way as to prevent the acquisition of such 
knowledge by any other than a highly trained elite of specialists in the various domains of legal study”). 
 316. A REFORM AGENDA, supra note 221, at 196. 
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exoteric law. In addition to this device, an accessible platform where the 
public can gain access to this heuristic should also be provided. Such a plat-
form, be it in physical space or cyber space, should be non-commercial and 
consultative. Admittedly, it is a challenging mission to launch this platform, 
requiring a vast amount of time, money, and energy. Disappointingly, the 
WTO as an organization seems to be an implausible candidate for the task 
considering its current infrastructure and limited capacity.317 
V. CONCLUSION: A PARADIGM SHIFT FROM GESELLSCHAFTIAN COULD 
TO GEMEINSCHAFTIAN SHOULD 
This Article defines the contemporary global trading system as the 
global Gesellschaft and ascribes its development failure to a Gesellschaftian 
structure driven by interest, negotiation, and contract, and thus vulnerable to 
power disparity and exploitation. The global Gesellschaft is motivated by 
the liberal spirit of “right” under which each member could do whatever 
may suit its interest. As Steven Brint observes, liberalism has often been 
antagonistic to community, that is, the Gemeinschaft, as a normative con-
cept mainly because it views community as having a tendency to limit free-
dom and creativity with potential authoritarianism.318 Although this liberal 
concern is in harmony with the Lockean premise of the social contract, and 
is adept at explaining domestic political phenomena, it has its own limita-
tions in the international sphere. Indeed, right-oriented behavioral patterns 
risk rationalizing the selfish behavior of powerful members that often disre-
gards other members’ interests. Perhaps, more profoundly, there is simply a 
“deep tension” between liberal democracies and cosmopolitan considera-
tion.319 Yet, such inherited and embedded liberal assumptions are prone to 
criticism and problematization in this era of unsustainability and develop-
ment disparity.320 
However, if we transform our paradigmatic perspective from right to 
duty under the Gemeinschaftian realization, we will take the interests of 
others into account when we configure our own. After all, common prosper-
ity and peace is the ultimate goal of the Gemeinschaft. The gestalt of 
WTO’s Gemeinschaft is cosmopolitan communitarianism governed by the 
Law of Nations, or the jus gentium of international trade, whose core pre-
cept is the duty to assist. Under such a premise, the Gesellschaftian under-
standing of a state’s sovereignty as the unbridled exercise of its physical 
power in the international anarchy transforms into the Gemeinschaftian con-
  
 317. The WTO is increasingly underbudgeted and understaffed in technical cooperation activities. 
See WTO Committee on Trade and Development, 27th Sess., WTO Programme for Technical Coopera-
tion, WT/COMTD/W/64 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
 318. Brint, supra note 207, at 19. But see Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of 
Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685, 686-67 (1992) (observing that certain conservatives and critical legal 
scholars attack liberalism in the name of community). 
 319. See Goldsmith, supra note 265, at 1696. 
 320. M’Gongile, supra note 41, at 162. 
File: TheWTO'sGemeinschaft Created on: 5/31/2007 9:32:00 AM Last Printed: 6/11/2007 10:58:00 AM 
2004] The WTO’s Gemeinschaft 541 
struct of the “vindication of the state’s existence as a member of the interna-
tional system.”321  
In fact, the raison d’être of the WTO’s Gemeinschaft stems directly 
from the dire implications of the lost agenda of development. The global 
Gesellschaft can no longer sustain the current level of widening inequality 
and growing poverty,322 which might be depicted as the “global apart-
heid.”323 The annual sum of agricultural subsidies by the rich countries is 
deplorable—“enough to fly their 41 million dairy cows first class around the 
world one and a half times”324—while countless farmers in poor countries 
suffer from a continued suppression of their produce’s prices due to these 
subsidies.325 Critically, poverty is not merely an economic policy issue, but 
“a matter of life and death”326 to many people around the globe.327 A system 
failing to address such unsustainable economic inequality and injustice can-
not resist being criticised as illegitimate and unfair.328 This global economic 
injustice resulting from the failed global Gesellschaft will become more 
painful and severe, and thus less tolerable, as the Gesellschaft becomes 
more integrated and interdependent.329 Thus, underdevelopment and mar-
ginalization in one corner of the globe could cause asymmetrical shocks or 
direct physical threats to another.330 Ultimately, the failure to deliver true 
development assistance is not confined to economic ramifications: It threat-
ens peace. In the face of such exigency, the WTO Gesellschaft has not been, 
and should not be, an answer. Only global empathy realized through the 
achievement and operation of the WTO Gemeinschaft based on the Law of 
Nations can deliver true changes.  
  
 321. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995) (emphasis added). 
 322. Cf. United Nation Millennium Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/res/55/2, para. 5 (Sept. 18, 2000) (“For 
while globalization offers great opportunities, at present its benefits are very unevenly shared, while its 
costs are unevenly distributed.”), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf. 
 323. See Trachtman, supra note 293, at 3 (quoting South African President Thabo Mbeki). 
 324. WTO, The 10 Benefits of the WTO Trading System: 4. Freer Trade Cuts the Cost of Living, http: 
//www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b04_e.htm. (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). The 
average European cow receives more monetary aid ($2.50) than most African workers receive as a daily 
wage ($2). Michael Kitchen, IMF-World Bank: Meetings Focus on Reform, Millennium Goals, UN 
WIRE, Sept. 30, 2002, at http://www.unwire.org/unwire/20020930/current.asp. 
 325. See John Kanjagaile, Cancún Should Cultivate Fairness, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, available 
at www.ft.com. 
 326. Rome Speech, supra note 105. 
 327. See, e.g., Charlotte Denny, US Blocks Brown-led Drive for Increase in Aid, GUARDIAN 
UNLIMITED, Jan. 23, 2002 (reporting that 2.8 billion people on earth live on less than $2 a day), avail-
able at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,3604,637808,00.html. 
 328. Amartya Sen eloquently wrote that this inequality will become less and less tolerable as the 
global trading community becomes more integrated. Amartya Sen, Global Doubts, HARV. MAG. 68 
(Sept.-Oct. 2000). 
 329. Id. 
 330. See POVERTY: U.K. Chancellor Calls for New Marshall Plan for the Developing States, UN 
WIRE, Dec. 18, 2001 (quoting Gordon Brown, U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer, who linked “poverty 
in the developing world” to “direct physical threats to people in industrialized countries”), available at ht 
tp://www.unwire.org/unwire/20011218/22676_story.asp. 
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After all, we are all “involved in Mankind.”331 
  
 331. JOHN DONNE, MEDITATION XVII, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS (1624), available 
at http://isu.indstate.edu/ilnprof/ENG451/ISLAND/text.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).  
